We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2009
He that will fraunce wynne, must with Scotland first beginne.
WHEN I tell people that I'm studying English strategy in the Hundred Years War, the response is very often something to the effect of ‘did they really have “strategy” in the middle ages?’ This idea, that strategy was absent from the medieval period, remains deeply embedded in the historiography of the subject. Sir Charles Oman, probably still the best-known historian of medieval warfare, wrote of the middle ages that ‘the minor operations of war were badly understood, [and] strategy— the higher branch of the military art—was absolutely nonexistent. Professor Ferdinand Lot said much the same. Other scholars have argued that the medieval commander ‘had not the slightest notion of strategy’, or that ‘never was the art of war so imperfect or so primitive.’ But the truth is that most medieval commanders did not show ‘a total scorn for die intellectual side of war’ nor ignore ‘the most elementary principles of strategy’; nor is it fair to say that ‘“generalship” and “planning” are concepts one can doubtfully apply to medieval warfare.’
1 ‘the old auncient proverbe used by our forfathers,’ according to Halle, Edward. The Union of the Two Noble Families of Lancaster and York (1548)Google Scholar, sub Henry V, folio 39V.
2 He first made this comment in 1885, but as late as 1953 John Beeler, then among the foremost medieval military historians, wrote that ‘this is still the generally accepted view of the medieval concept of war.’ Oman, C. W. C., The Art of War in the Middle Ages revised and edited by Beeler, J. H. (1953), 61Google Scholar, 61n.
3 Lot, Ferdinand, L'art militaire et Us armées au moyen age (1946), II, 449Google Scholar: ‘la grande stratégic est inexistante’ in the Middle Ages. Napoleon III and I. Favé, , Études sur le passé et l'avenir de I'Artillerie, (1846), 31Google Scholar; Overstraeten, R. Van, Des principes de la guerre à travers les àges (1926)Google Scholar, quoted in Contamine, Philippe, War in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1987), 209Google Scholar.
4 Montross, Lynn, War Through the Ages (New York, 1960), 135Google Scholar.
5 Keegan, John, The Face of Battle (New York, 1984), 336Google Scholar. Cf. SirHoward, Michael, War in European History (Oxford, 1977), 27Google Scholar.
6 Oman, C.W.C., A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (1924) II, III, 126Google Scholar; cf. 160. This view remains pervasive: the best general textbook on medieval history, Tierney, Brian and Painter's, SidneyWestern Europe in the Middle Ages, 300–1475 (New York, 1983), 495Google Scholar, claims that Edward ‘had too little grasp of reality to be a competent strategist’.
7 Fuller, J. F. C., The Decisive Battles of the Western World and their Influence upon History, ed. Terraine, J., (1970), 311Google Scholar. Wrottesley, G., Crecy and Calais from the Public Records (1898), iiiGoogle Scholar; cf. Powicke, Michael, ‘The English Aristocracy and the War’, in The Hundred Tears War, Fowler, Kenneth (ed.) (1971), 127Google Scholar.
8 Although Hewitt himself was unwilling to acknowledge it as such—he considered it part of the ‘practice of war’ as distinct from the ‘art of war’, thus separating it from the realm of strategy. Hewitt, H.J., The Organization of War Under Edward III, 1338–62 (Manchester, 1966)Google Scholar, in. Cf. Hewitt, H.J., The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355–1357, (Manchester, 1958), 13, 105Google Scholar.
9 Hewitt, , Organization, 99Google Scholar; Hewitt, H.J., ‘The Organisation of War’ in The Hundred Tears War (ed.) Fowler, Kenneth (1971), 86–7Google Scholar. Cf. Allmand, Christopher, The Hundred Tears War, (Cambridge, 1988), 54–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
10 Allmand, C.T., ‘The War and the Non-Combatant’ in The Hundred Tears War (ed.) Fowler, , 166Google Scholar; Allmand, , The Hundred Tears War, 54–5Google Scholar. Fowler, Kenneth, The Age of Plantagenet and Valois (New York, 1967), 152Google Scholar. Prestwich, Michael, The Three Edwards (1980), 177–8, 180, 186Google Scholar. Keen, Maurice H., England in the Later Middle Ages (1973), 135Google Scholar. Waugh, Scott L., England in the Reign of Edward III (Cambridge, 1991), 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 But see Patourel, J. Le, ‘Edward III and the Kingdom of France’, History, XLIII (1958)Google Scholar.
12 For a concise but informed treatment, see Fowler, Kenneth, The King's Lieutenant (New York, 1969), 205–6Google Scholar.
13 Knighton, I, 452. Cf. Petrarch's comment to the same effect, quoted in Boutruche, R., ‘The Devastation of Rural Areas During the Hundred Years War and the Agricultural Recovery of France’, in The Recovery of France in the Fifteenth Century, ed. Lewis, P. S., (New York, 1972), 26Google Scholar.
14 For tax revenues, see Public Record Office, London: E359/14mm 13, 13d. For extortion, see Stevenson, J. (ed.), Chronicon de Lanercost, (Edinburgh, 1839), 222Google Scholar, and Calendar of Close Rolls, 1318–23, 274.
15 John, of Fordun, , Chronica Gentis Scotorum ed. Skene, W. F., (Edinburgh 1871), 351Google Scholar.
16 Bel, Jean le, Chroniqm de Jean le Bel ed. Viard, Jules & Deprez, Eugene. (Paris, 1904), I, 55Google Scholar.
17 le Bel, , Chronique, I, 63Google Scholar.
18 This was just what the English Council had anticipated. See ibid., I, 54.
19 Ibid., 66.
20 Willard, J. F., ‘The Scotch Raids and the Fourteenth-Century Taxation of Northern England’ University of Colorado Studes V, no. 4 (1908), 238–40Google Scholar. Cf. Rotuli Parliamentorum, II, 176.
21 Knighton, Henrici, Chronicon, ed. Lumby, J. R.. (Rolls Series, 1895), I, 445Google Scholar.
22 The Brut, or The Chronicles of England, ed. Brie, F. W. D. (1906), 251Google Scholar. Cf. Gray, Thomas, Scalacronica ed. Stevenson, Joseph (Edinburgh, 1836), 155Google Scholar: ‘Le roy, vn innocent, plora dez oils’. The Chronicon de Lanercost, ed. Stevenson, J. (Edinburgh, 1836), 260Google Scholar, also supports the story.
23 Murimuth, Adam, Continuatio Chronicarum ed. Thompson, E. M. (1889), 53Google Scholar.
24 It is worth noting that Edward personally objected to the Treaty of Northampton, agreeing to its terms only under pressure from Mortimer and Isabella. Nicholson, Ranald, Edward III and the Scots (Oxford, 1965), 51Google Scholar.
25 Chronicler, Bridlington, Gesta Edwardi Tertii Auctore Canonico Bridlingtonensi in Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II, ed. Stubbs, W. (1883), II, 102–3, 106Google Scholar; Scalacronica, 159; Lanercost, 267; Andrew, of Wyntoun, , Orygynale Chronykil of Scotland, ed. Lang, D. (Edinburgh, 1872), II, 383–5Google Scholar.
26 For Halidon hill, see Bridlington, , Gesta Edwards, 114–16Google Scholar; Wyntoun, , Orygjmale Cronykil, II, 401–2Google Scholar; Lanercost, 273–4; Brut I, 283–9; Walter, of Hemingburgh, , Chronicon (1849), II, 308–9Google Scholar; Burton, Thomas, Chronka Monasterii de Melsa (1867), II, 369–70Google Scholar.
27 For an explanation of the effectiveness of the longbow, and an analysis of the broader social implications of the English infantry-based style of war, see Rogers, Clifford J., ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War’, Journal of Military History, LVII (1993), 249–57Google Scholar.
28 Except by an enemy with missile superiority.
29 Ckronica Monasterii de Meisa, III, 73; cf. 41, 50, and John, of Reading, Chronica Johannis de Reading et anonymi Cantuariensis, 1346–1367 ed. Tait, J. (Manchester, 1914), 122Google Scholar.
30 Scalacronica, 168. Cf. Froissart, , Oeuvres, II, 353Google Scholar and III, 16.
31 Froissart, , Oeuvres, III, 44Google Scholar.
32 Allmand, , ‘The War and the Non-Combatant’, 169–70Google Scholar, attributes die destruction to lack of regular pay, although this seems to be inconsistent with his overall argument. But if the lack of regular pay were die reason for the devastation, then we would expect to see little or no destruction at die outset of a campaign, since most indentures specified that one quarter or more of die total wages be paid in advance; yet diere is no evidence for an increase in die amount of destruction inflicted as the campaign went on. Furthermore, le Bel comments repeatedly on how well paid Edward's armies were.
33 The phrase is from Sir John Fastolf's 1435 report advocating a return to the chevauchée strategy, in Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry the Sixth, King of England ed. Stevenson, J. (1861–1864), II, 581Google Scholar.
34 Despite Hewitt's contention, which I find quite mystifying considering the overall direction of his argument, that ‘looting arose neither from military policy nor from military necessity’ (‘Organisation’, 37; cf. Organisation, 96). Compare Fastolf's suggestions on military policy of 1435, in Letters and Papers, ed. Stevenson, , II, 581Google Scholar.
35 Fortescue, John, De Laudibus Legum Anglie ed. and tr. Chrimes, S. B. (Cambridge 1942), 33Google Scholar: ‘a king … is obliged to protect the law, the subjects, and their bodies and goods, and he has the power to this end issuing from the people, so that it is not permissible for him to rule his people with any other power.’ Cf. 35, 89.
36 Froissart, , Oeuvres, XII, 109Google Scholar. Philip's repeated failure to prevent the English from ravaging his realm led Jean le Bel to denounce him as unworthy of the apellation ‘noble’—in contrast with Edward, III, who ‘cannot be too much honored’. Chronique, II, 65Google Scholar.
37 Herald, Chandos, Life of the Black Prince, eds. Pope, M. K. and Lodge, E. C. (Oxford, 1910), 7Google Scholar.
38 Perroy, Edouard, The Hundred Years War (New York, 1965), 119. CfGoogle Scholar. Contamine, Philippe, La Guerre de Cent Ans (1972), 29Google Scholar; Prestwich, , The Three Edwards, 177–8, 186Google Scholar; Bradbury, Jim, The Medieval Archer (Woodbridge, 1985), 105Google Scholar, 111; Keen, Maurice, England in the Later Middle Ages (1973), 135Google Scholar, and citations to other authors named, below.
39 Barber, Richard, Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine (1978), 58Google Scholar, re. Edward Ill's decision to wait for Philip at Poissy.
40 lbid., 62, re. his not attempting to escape Philip after the crossing of the Somme.
41 Emerson, Barbara, The Black Prince (1976), 34Google Scholar.
42 The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, ed., Barber, Richard (1979), 13Google Scholar.
43 Burne, A. H., The Crecy War (1955), 154Google Scholar.
44 Barber, , Edward, Prince of Waks and Aquitaine, 59Google Scholar.
45 See his letter to Clement VI, in Robert, of Avesbury, , De Gestis Mirabilibus Regis Edwardi Tertii ed. Thompson, E. M. (1889), 380–81Google Scholar; his earlier letter to Simon Boccanegra, quoted in Sumption, Jonathan, The Hundred Tears War: Trial by Battle, (1990), 380Google Scholar; and also his letters cited in notes 63 and 68, below.
46 That is the version of the saying, which translates roughly as ‘do the right thing, come what may,’ in Guillaume de Machaut's Le confort d'ami, a near-contemporary text on chivalry. Francçois de Montebelluna also gives the same admonition. See Autrand, Franç;oise, ‘La déconfiture. La bataille de Poitiers (1356) a travers quelques textes français des XIVe-XVe siécles’, in Guerre et sociéte en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne. XlVe–XVe Siètick, eds. Contamine, Philippe et al. (Lille, 1991), 95–96Google Scholar. Edward's personal character was well in accord with this motto, for ‘he dred neurer of none myshappes, ne harmes ne evyll fortune, that myght falle a noble warryour’. The Brut or the Chronicle of England ed. Brie, F.W. (1906–1908), II, 333Google Scholar.
47 Among the leaders of the English army at Crécy, for example, Richard Talbot, Ralph Stafford and Fulk Fitzwarren had fought at Dupplin Muir, while Edward III, Bartholomew Burghersh, Ralph Basset, John Willoughby and the earls of Warwick, Oxford, Arundel and Suffolk had fought at Halidon Hill. The earl of Northampton had been the commander at Morlaix, where lord Stafford and Reginald Cobham also fought. It is significant that the four veteran soldiers assigned to choose the ground for the English formations at Crécy—Warwick, Stafford, Cobham and Godfrey d'Harcourt— thus included at least one of the leaders from each of these three battles.
48 Froissart, , Oeuvres, VII, 333Google Scholar: ‘ne n'ont pas ressongne pour ce se il n'estoient point moult grant fusion’.
49 The Brut, I, 288.
50 Chronique, II, 86–7. See Sumption, , Trial by Battle, 514Google Scholar for the concessions offered by Philip early in the campaign in hopes of avoiding battle.
51 This is the interpretation in Perroy, , The Hundred Tears War, 119Google Scholar, for example.
52 For Edward's desire to meet his allies, and the English army's need for food, see the Chronique et Annales de Gilles le Muisit, Abbé de Saint-Martin de Toumai ed. Lemaitre, H. (1906), 158–9Google Scholar. The northward movement after crossing the Somme led to the capture ‘graunt plente du vitailks’ on the eve of the battle of Crécy. Avesbury, , Gestis Mirabilibus, 368Google Scholar.
53 Jean le Bel's statement that Edward, after crossing the Seine and reaching Beauvais, ‘did not want to stop to drive out the local people nor for any other reason, because he had no other intention but to besiege the strong city of Calais, since he could not be attacked [estre combastu] by Philip, king, as he desired' (Chronique, II, 89)Google Scholar, like Froissart's indication that Edward had already decided to march to Calais before his capture of Caen, (Oeuvres, IV, 412)Google Scholarwould seem to be distortions of hindsight, were it not for the support offered by PRO 081/314/17803, in which Edward orders from Caen that supplies be sent to Le Crotoy, which is north of the Somme on the way to Calais. Edward probably hoped that a siege of Calais would be enough to provoke Philip into an attack if the ravages of his chevauchee proved insufficient.
54 Froissart, , Oeuvres, V, 3, 7Google Scholar, makes this explicit.
55 Scalacronica, 169.
56 Just as the English tried to do to the Scots along the Wear in 1327. Froissart, , Oeuvres, II, 166–7Google Scholar.
57 Rotuli Parliamentonm, II, 148.
58 Harris, G. L., King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford, 1975), 320Google Scholar. The writs of summons for the expedition specified that it was being undertaken ‘to make an end of the war’. Wrottesley, , Crecy and Calais, 53Google Scholar.
59 Barnie, John, War in Medieval English Society: Social Values in the Hundred Tears War 1337–99 (Ithaca, New York, 1974), 21Google Scholar.
60 Oeuvres, IV, 381–2: ‘ne désiroit fors à trouver les armes et ses ennemis’.
61 Baker, Geoffrey le, Chonicon Galfiidi le Baker de Swynebroke, ed. Thompson, E. M. (1889), 82Google Scholar.
62 Printed in the notes to the Roxburgh Club edition of Chandos Herald's The Black Prince (1842), 351–5, here at 352–3. An English translation of the letter is easily available in Barber, Life and Campaigns, but it should be used with caution, because the (usually reliable) editor has at one point left out four lines of text. Cf. the Anmimalle Chronicle, 1333–1381 ed. Galbraith, V. H. (1927), 21Google Scholar, and Chronka Monasterii de Melsa, III, 57.
63 PRO, C81/314/17803; Cf. Froissart, , Oeuvres, XVIII, 287Google Scholar. Compare the letter of Bartholomew Burghersh to Archbishop Stratford, written at the time: ‘et [le roi] pense de sui trere tot dreit devers soun adversere, de faire del fyn coom Dieu luy ad ordeyne’. Murimuth, , Continuatio Chronkarum, 203Google Scholar.
64 I use here the readable translation of Richard Barber, in Life and Campaigns, with emphasis added. The relevant pages in Barber are 30, 31, 37. The original Latin can be found in Moisant, J., Le Prince Noir en Aquitaine (1894), 162–3Google Scholar,163, 168–9. On the use of fire and smoke to provoke the enemy, see also le Bel, , Chronique, II, 85–6Google Scholar.
65 Chronica Monasterii de Melsa, III, 57 (Emphasis added). Cf. II, 73, and the Anonimalle Chronicle, 21.
66 Chronique, II, 89.
67 Sumption, , Trial by Battle, 520Google Scholar.
68 Emphasis added. Calendar of Patent Rails (1345–48), 516–17; dated August 15, (the day before Edward crossed the Seine) at Autes(?). It is quite possible, however, that ‘Autes’ is Auteuil, which Edward did not reach until the 17th.The more often used version given in the Acts of War of Edward III(Moisant, , Le Prince Noir, 171–2Google Scholar; reprinted in Froissart, Oeuvres, TV, 497, and in English translation in Barber, Life and Campaigns, 38) is nearly identical to the enrolled form of the letter (which I have checked), but misses out one key phrase in the first sentence of the text given above: it has ‘to make an end to the war’ omitting the ‘by battle’ immediately following.
69 Cf. le Bel, , Chrmique, II, 106, 212Google Scholar.
70 Avesbury, , Gestis Mirabilibus, 363Google Scholar. The author of the Grandes Chroniques considered it a great marvel that ‘the nobles [of France] sank the boats and broke the bridges everywhere the king of England passed, when they should, quite the opposite, have used the boats and bridges to cross over against him in order to defend the country.’ Grandes Chroniques de France, ed. Viard, J. (1937), IX, 276Google Scholar.
71 This version, from The Chronicle of Jean de Venette tr. Birdsall, J., ed. Newhall, R. A. (New York, 1953), 41Google Scholar, is more complete than the Latin version in the Société de phistoire de France's 1843 edition, 199, which omits the adverb ‘taciter’.
72 In Froissart, , Oeuores, IV, 495Google Scholar. Cf. the Grandes Chroniques, LX, 276.
73 Cf. le Bel, , Chronique, I, 53Google Scholar, for the English using the smoke from fires set by the Scots in 1327 to find their enemy.
74 In Moisant, , Le Prince Noir, 170–171Google Scholar.
75 According to le Baker, , Chronicon, 82Google Scholar.
76 Burne, , The Crecy War, 152, 157Google Scholar.
77 Barber, , Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine, 58, 62Google Scholar.
78 Avesbury, , Gestis Mirabilibus, 434Google Scholar.
79 le Baker, , Chronicon, 133Google Scholar. There is a similar story concerning Périgueux (for the 1356 chevauchée) in Avesbury, , Gestis Mirabilibus, 457Google Scholar.
80 le Baker, , Chronicon, 138–9Google Scholar.
81 Froissart, , Oeiares, V, 353, 351Google Scholar. Cf. 347.
82 Chronique, II, 221–2.
83 Avesbury, , Gestis Mirabilibus, 442Google Scholar. The Anonimalle Chronicle's claim (page 35) that the English destroyed eleven bonnes villes and 3,700 villages on this chevauchee is doubtless an exaggeration, but it is certainly evocative.
84 Jusselin, M., ‘Comment la France se préparait à la guerre de cent ans’ Bibliothéque de pécole des chartes, LXXIII, (1912)Google Scholar, doc. II (Touraine and Sens in doc. III). Froissart (Oeuvres, V, 344) points out that Toulouse was not much smaller than Paris.
85 Avesbury, , Gestis Mirabilibus, 441–2Google Scholar.
86 Avesbury, , Gestis Mirabilibus, 435–6Google Scholar.
87 Anonimalle Chronicle, 35.
88 le Baker, , Chronicon, 137Google Scholar.
89 Scatacronica, 196 (‘ne trouerount nul part countenaunce a ceo faire.’) Cf. 194. I intend to argue this case more fully in a book to be entitled Ware Cruelle and Sharpe: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360.
90 Dupuy, R. Ernest and Dupuy, Trevor, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York, 1970), 357Google Scholar.
