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The Very Idea of Feminist Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Lynn Hankinson Nelson
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Abstract

The juxtaposition encompassed in the phrase “feminist epistemology” strikes some feminist theorists and mainstream epistemologists as incongruous. To others, the phrase signals the view that epistemology and the philosophy of science are not what some of their practitioners and advocates have wanted or claimed them to be—but also are not “dead,” as some of their critics proclaim. This essay explores the grounds for and implications of each view and recommends the second.

Type
Research Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 10 , Issue 3: Special Issue: Analytic Feminism , Summer 1995 , pp. 31 - 49
Copyright
Copyright © 1995 by Hypatia, Inc.

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