Concentrated Corporate Ownership

edited by Randall K. Morck

University of Chicago Press, 2000
Cloth: 978-0-226-53678-1 | Electronic: 978-0-226-53682-8
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226536828.001.0001

AVAILABLE FROM

University of Chicago Press (cloth, ebook)
Barnes & Noble Nook
Chegg Inc
DeGruyter Multi-User Ebook Program
ebrary
EBSCO eBooks (formerly NetLibrary)
Google Play
Kno
OverDrive

ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising.

What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms?
Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Randall K. Morck is the Stephen A. Jarislowsky Distinguished Professor of Finance at the University of Alberta and has published extensively on corporate governance.

Foreword

Acknowledgments

Introduction

I. The Origins of Ownership Structure

1. The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success: Organizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities

2. Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public: Private versus Social Optimality

3. Some of the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Ownership Concentration in Canada

4. Corporations and Taxation: A Largely Private Matter?

II. The Law and Concentrated Corporate Ownership

5. Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders

6. Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations

7. Waiting for the Omelette to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression

8. Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts

III. Economic Effects of Concentrated Corporate Ownership

9. Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance

10. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights

11. Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth The Canadian Disease?

Contributors

Name Index

Subject Index