Download This PaperInstitutional Investors and Cost Stickiness: Theory and Evidence
The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Forthcoming
46 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2016 Last revised: 25 Dec 2022
Date Written: May 9, 2018
Abstract
Cost stickiness measures the degree of suboptimal cost reduction in response to a decline in a firm’s activity. This study examines the role of institutional monitoring in addressing the value-decreasing cost-stickiness problem exhibited in many firms. Using alternative proxies for institutional monitoring, we find that long-term institutional investors are associated with reductions in cost stickiness and that these reductions lead to superior future market and accounting performance. Our findings are robust to different model specifications and are independent of the effect of internal governance.
Keywords: institutional monitoring, cost stickiness, F-score, corporate governance
JEL Classification: G20, G33, G32, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation