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Quantifying the reflective DDoS attack capability of household IoT devices

Published:18 July 2017Publication History

ABSTRACT

Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are increasing in frequency and volume on the Internet, and there is evidence that cyber-criminals are turning to Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices such as cameras and vending machines as easy launchpads for large-scale attacks. This paper quantifies the capability of consumer IoT devices to participate in reflective DDoS attacks. We first show that household devices can be exposed to Internet reflection even if they are secured behind home gateways. We then evaluate eight household devices available on the market today, including lightbulbs, webcams, and printers, and experimentally profile their reflective capability, amplification factor, duration, and intensity rate for TCP, SNMP, and SSDP based attacks. Lastly, we demonstrate reflection attacks in a real-world setting involving three IoT-equipped smart-homes, emphasising the imminent need to address this problem before it becomes widespread.

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM Conferences
    WiSec '17: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
    July 2017
    297 pages
    ISBN:9781450350846
    DOI:10.1145/3098243

    Copyright © 2017 ACM

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    • Published: 18 July 2017

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