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Protecting browsers from DNS rebinding attacks

Published:17 January 2009Publication History
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Abstract

DNS rebinding attacks subvert the same-origin policy of browsers, converting them into open network proxies. Using DNS rebinding, an attacker can circumvent organizational and personal firewalls, send spam email, and defraud pay-per-click advertisers. We evaluate the cost effectiveness of mounting DNS rebinding attacks, finding that an attacker requires less than $100 to hijack 100,000 IP addresses. We analyze defenses to DNS rebinding attacks, including improvements to the classic “DNS pinning,” and recommend changes to browser plug-ins, firewalls, and Web servers. Our defenses have been adopted by plug-in vendors and by a number of open-source firewall implementations.

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Transactions on the Web
        ACM Transactions on the Web  Volume 3, Issue 1
        January 2009
        123 pages
        ISSN:1559-1131
        EISSN:1559-114X
        DOI:10.1145/1462148
        Issue’s Table of Contents

        Copyright © 2009 ACM

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        Publication History

        • Published: 17 January 2009
        • Accepted: 1 October 2008
        • Revised: 1 September 2008
        • Received: 1 June 2008
        Published in tweb Volume 3, Issue 1

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