Skip to main content
Log in

Dissolving the Explanatory Gap: Neurobiological Differences Between Phenomenal and Propositional Knowledge

  • Published:
Brain and Mind

Abstract

The explanatory gap and theknowledge argument are rooted in the conflationof propositional and phenomenal knowledge. Thebasic knowledge argument is based on theconsideration that ``physical information'' aboutthe nervous system is unable to provide theknowledge of a ``color experience'' (Jackson,1982). The implication is that physicalism isincomplete or false because it leaves somethingunexplained. The problem with Jackson'sargument is that physical information has theform of highly symbolic propositional knowledgewhereas phenomenal knowledge consists in innateneurophysiological processes. In addition totheir fundamental epistemological differences,clinical, anatomical, pathological and brainimaging studies demonstrate that phenomenal andpropositional knowledge are fundamentallydifferent neurobiological processes. Propositional knowledge is phylogeneticallynew, highly symbolic, culturally acquired,exclusively human and expressible in differentnatural and artificial languages. By contrast,phenomenal knowledge (i.e.: knowingwhat-it-is-like to see a color) consists inqualitative experiences and phenomenal conceptsthat provide an internal, language-independentreference to the properties of objects and theneeds of the organism. Language andpropositional knowledge are exclusively humanattributes implemented in specific regions ofthe dominant hemisphere. This contrastssharply with the phylogenicallysensory areas that are common to animals andhumans, which implement qualitativeexperiences. Experiences are hard-wiredneurobiological processes that can neither betransmitted nor re-created through thesymbolism of propositions. Thus, I concludethat the fallacy in the explanatory gap and inthe knowledge argument is a fallacy ofequivocation that results from ignoringfundamental neurobiological differences betweenphenomenal and propositional knowledge.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Abbott, L. and Sejnowski, T.J., 1999: Introduction, in L. Abbott and T.J. Sejnowski (eds), Neural Codes and Distributed Representations: Foundations of Neural Computation, MIT, Cambridge, MA, pp. vii–xxiii.

    Google Scholar 

  • Akil, H., Mayer, D.J. and Liebeskin, J.C., 1976: Antagonism of stimulation–produced analgesia by naloxone, a narcotic antagonist, Science 191, 961–962.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bair, W., Koch, C., Newsome, W. and Britten, K., 1994: Power spectrum analysis of bursting cells in area MT in the behaving monkey, J. Neurosci. 14, 2870–2892.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartels, A. and Zeki, S., 2000: The architecture of the colour centre in the human visual brain: new results and a review, Eur. J. Neurosci. 12, 172–193.

    Google Scholar 

  • Basbaum, A.I. and Jessell, T.M., 2000: The perception of pain, in E.R. Kandel, J.H. Schwartz and T.M. Jessell (eds), Principles of Neural Science, McGraw–Hill, New York, pp. 472–492.

    Google Scholar 

  • Block, N., Flanagan, O. and Guzeldere, G., 1997: The Nature of Consciousness, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Block, N., 1997a: Inverted earth, in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Guzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 677–693.

    Google Scholar 

  • Block, N., 1997b: On a confusion about a function of consciousness, in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Guzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 375–415.

    Google Scholar 

  • Block, N., 2002: Theharder problem of consciousness, The Journal of Philosophy XCIX, 1–35.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bogen, J.E., 1997: Some neurophysiologic aspects of consciousness, Semin. Neurol. 17, 95–103.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bookheimer, S.Y., 1996: Functional MRI applications in clinical epilepsy, Neuroimage 4, S139–S146.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bookheimer, S.Y., 2002: Functional MRI of language. New approaches to understanding the cortical organization of semantic processing, Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 25, 151–188.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bushnell, M.C., Duncan, G.H., Hofbauer, R.K., Ha, B., Chen, J.I. and Carrier, B., 1999: Pain perception: Is there a role for primary somatosensory cortex? Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 7705–7709.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caramazza, A. and Hillis, A.E., 1991: Lexical organization of nouns and verbs in the brain, Nature 349, 788–790.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, P., 2000: Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cassirer, E., 1944: An Essay on Man. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture, Yale University Press, New Haven and London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D.J., 1996: The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chapman, C.R. and Nakamura, Y., 1999: A passion of the soul: An introduction to pain for consciousness researchers, Consciousness & Cognition 8, 391–422.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P.S. and Sejnowski, T.J., 1992: The Computational Brain, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P.M., 1995: The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, T.W., 1995: Function and phenomenology: Closing the explanatory gap, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2, 241–254.

    Google Scholar 

  • Craig, A.D., Reiman, E.M., Evans, A. and Bushnell, M.C., 1996: Functional imaging of an illusion of pain, Nature 384, 258–260.

    Google Scholar 

  • Craik, K.J.W., 1943: The Nature of Explanation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crick, F. and Koch, C., 1990: Some reflections on visual awareness, Cold Spring Harbor Symp. Quant. Biol. LV, 953–962.

    Google Scholar 

  • Critchley, M., 1970: Aphasiology and Other Aspects of Language, Edward Arnold, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cytowic, R.E., 1993: The Man Who Tasted Shapes, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Damasio, A., Bellugi, U., Damasio, H., Poizner, H. and Van Gilder, J., 1986: Sign language aphasia during left–hemisphere Amytal injection, Nature 322, 363–365.

    Google Scholar 

  • Damasio, A.R. and Tranel, D., 1993: Nouns and verbs are retrieved with differently distributed neural systems, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 90, 4957–4960.

    Google Scholar 

  • Damasio, H., Grabowski, T.J., Tranel, D., Hichwa, R.D. and Damasio, A.R., 1996: A neural basis for lexical retrieval [see comments] [published erratum appears in Nature 1996 Jun 27; 381(6595): 810], Nature 380, 499–505.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deacon, T.W., 1997: The Symbolic Species: the Co–evolution of Language and the Brain, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, NY.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deadwyler, S.A. and Hampson, R.E., 1997: The significance of neural ensemble codes during behavior and cognition, Annual Review of Neuroscience 20, 217–244.

    Google Scholar 

  • Desmedt, J.E. and Tomberg, C., 1995: Consciousness, Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. Suppl. 44, 227–234.

    Google Scholar 

  • Devlin, J.T., Moore, C.J., Mummery, C.J., Gorno–Tempini, M.L., Phillips, J.A., Noppeney, U., Frackowiak, R.S., Friston, K.J. and Price, C.J., 2002: Anatomic constraints on cognitive theories of category specificity, Neuroimage. 15, 675–685.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dronkers, N.F., Pinker, S. and Damasio, A., 2000: Language and the Aphasias, in E.R. Kandel, J.H. Schwartz and T.M. Jessell (eds), Principles of Neural Science, McGraw–Hill, New York, pp. 1169–1185.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edmonds, H.L. and Stark, L.G., 1974: Penicillin–induced epileptogenic foci–II. The anticonvulsant and neuropharmacological effects of SC–13504 in the cat, Neuropharmacology 13, 269–277.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engel, A.K., Fries, P., Konig, P., Brecht, M. and Singer, W., 1999: Temporal binding, binocular rivalry, and consciousness, Consciousness & Cognition 8, 128–151.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engel, A.K., Roelfsema, P.R., Fries, P., Brecht, M. and Singer,W., 1997: Role of the temporal domain for response selection and perceptual binding, Cerebral Cortex 7, 571–582.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferster, D. and Spruston, N., 1995: Cracking the neuronal code, Science 270, 756–757.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flanagan, O., 1992: Consciousness Reconsidered, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J.A., 1979: The Language of Thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Galuske, R.A., Schlote, W., Bratzke, H. and Singer, W., 2000: Interhemispheric asymmetries of the modular structure in human temporal cortex [see comments], Science 289, 1946–1949.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gannon, P.J., Holloway, R.L., Broadfield, D.C. and Braun, A.R., 1998: Asymmetry of chimpanzee planum temporale: Humanlike pattern of Wernicke's brain language area homolog, Science 279, 220–222.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gardner, E.P. and Martin, J.H., 2000: Coding of sensory information, in E.R. Kandel, J.H. Schwartz and T.M. Jessell (eds), Principles of Neural Science, McGraw–Hill, New York, pp. 411–429.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gautrais, J. and Thorpe, S., 1998: Rate coding versus temporal order coding: A theoretical approach, Biosystems 48, 57–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gomez–Tortosa, E., Martin, E.M., Gaviria, M., Charbel, F. and Ausman, J.I., 1995: Selective deficit of one language in a bilingual patient following surgery in the left perisylvian area, Brain & Language 48, 320–325.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grabowski, T.J., Damasio, H. and Damasio, A.R., 1998: Premotor and prefrontal correlates of category–related lexical retrieval, Neuroimage. 7, 232–243.

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffin, D.R., 1992: Animal Minds, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Groh, J.M., 2001: Converting neural signals from place codes to rate codes, Biol. Cybern. 85, 159–165.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardcastle, V.G., 1998: Assuming away the explanatory gap, Consciousness & Cognition: an International Journal 7, 173–179.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardcastle, V.G., 1999: The Myth of Pain, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G., 1990: The intrinsic quality of experience, in J.E. Tomberling (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 4. Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, 1990, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero, CA, pp. 32–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hubbard, T.L., 1996: The importance of a consideration of qualia to imagery and cognition, Conscious. Cogn. 5, 327–358.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, F., 1982: Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 127–136.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, F., 1998: Postscript on qualia, in F. Jackson (ed.), Mind, Method and Conditionals, Rutledge, London and New York, pp. 76–79.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joliot, M., Ribary, U. and Llinas, R., 1994: Human oscillatory brain activity near 40 Hz coexists with cognitive temporal Binding, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 91, 11748–11751.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kandel, E.R., Schwartz, J.H. and Jessell, T.M., 2000: Principles of Neural Science, McGraw–Hill, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kandel, E.R. and Wurtz, R.H., 2000: Constructing the visual image, in E.R. Kandel, J.H. Schwartz and T.M. Jessell (eds), Principles of Neural Science, McGraw–Hill, New York, pp. 492–506.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, K.H.S., Relkin, N.R., Lee, K.M. and Hirsch, J., 1997: Distinct cortical areas associated with native and second languages, Nature 388, 171–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kosslyn, S.M., 1996: Image and Brain: The resolution of the Imagery Debate, MIT Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S.A., 1980: Excerpt from “identity and necessity”, in N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 144–147.

    Google Scholar 

  • LeDoux, J.E., 1996: The Emotional Brain, Simon and Schuster, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lennie, P., 2000: Color vision, in E.R. Kandel, J.H. Schwartz and T.M. Jessell (eds), Principles of Neural Science, McGraw–Hill, New York, pp. 572–589.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, J., 1983: Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, 354–361.

    Google Scholar 

  • Llinas, R., Ribary, U., Contreras, D. and Pedroarena, C., 1998: The neuronal basis for consciousness, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London – Series B: Biological Sciences 353, 1841–1849.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loar, B., 1997: Phenomenal states, in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Guzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 597–616.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loar, B., 1998: Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content. Ref type: Personal communication.

  • Lycan, W.G., 2000: Representational theories of consciousness. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Ref type: Electronic citation.

  • Marslen–Wilson, W.D. and Tyler, L.K., 1997: Dissociating types of mental computation, Nature 387, 592–594.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C., 1991: The Problem of Consciousness: Essays towards a Resolution, Blackwell Publishers, Inc., Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C., 1999: The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World, Basic Books, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • McNamara, T.P., 1999: Single–code versus multiple–code theories in cognition, in R.J. Sternberg (ed.), The Nature of Cognition, MIT, Cambridge, MA, pp. 113–135.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mehta, M.R., Lee, A.K. and Wilson, M.A., 2002: Role of experience and oscillations in transforming a rate code into a temporal code, Nature 417, 741–746.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metzinger, T., 1995a: Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic/Schoningh, Thorverton, UK.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metzinger, T., 1995b: The problem of consciousness, in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic/Sconingh, Thorverton, UK, pp. 3–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Munk, M.H., Roelfsema, P.R., Konig, P., Engel, A.K. and Singer, W., 1996: Role of reticular activation in the modulation of intracortical synchronization [see comments], Science 272, 271–274.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, T., 1980: What is it like to be a bat? in N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 159–168.

    Google Scholar 

  • Newman, J., 1995: Thalamic contributions to attention and consciousness [comment], Consciousness & Cognition 4, 172–193.

    Google Scholar 

  • Papineau, D., 1995: The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness, in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic/Schoningh, Thorverton, UK, pp. 259–270.

    Google Scholar 

  • Papineau, D., 1998: Mind the gap, in J.E. Tomberling (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 12, Language, Mind and Ontology, Blackwell Publishers, Inc., Malden, MA, pp. 374–388.

    Google Scholar 

  • Papineau, D., 2002: Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Penfield, W., 1975: The Mystery of the Mind, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Petrovic, P. and Ingvar, M., 2002: Imaging cognitive modulation of pain processing, Pain 95, 1–5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peyron, R., Laurent, B. and Garcia–Larrea, L., 2000: Functional imaging of brain responses to pain. A review and meta–analysis (2000), Neurophysiol. Clin. 30, 263–288.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pinker, S., 1997a: Language as a psychological adaptation, Ciba Found. Symp. 208, 162–172.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pinker, S., 1997b: Words and rules in the human brain, Nature 387, 547–548.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pinker, S., 1994: The Language Instinct, William Morrow and Co., Inc., New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Price, D.D., 2000: Psychological and neural mechanisms of the affective dimension of pain, Science 288, 1769–1772.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rainville, P., Duncan, G.H., Price, D.D., Carrier, B. and Bushnell, M.C., 1997: Pain affect encoded in human anterior cingulate but not somatosensory cortex, Science 277, 968–971.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ramachandran, V.S. and Hubbard, E.M., 2001: Synaesthesia – A window into perception, thought and language, Journal of Consciousness Studies 8, 3–34.

    Google Scholar 

  • Revonsuo, A., 2001: Putting color back where it belongs, Consciousness and Cognition 10, 78–84.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rey, G., 1998: A narrow representationalist account of qualitative experience, in J.E. Tomberling (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 12, Language, Mind and Ontology, Blackwell Publishers, Inc., Malden, MA, pp. 435–457.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, D.M., 2001: Color, mental location, and the visual field, Consciousness & Cognition 10, 85–93.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, P.W., 2001: The location problem for color subjectivism, Consciousness & Cognition 10, 42–58.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B., 1912: The Problems of Philosophy, Galaxy, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryle, G., 1949: The Concept of Mind, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sacks, O., 1990: The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales, Harper Perennial, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sacks, O., 1995: An Anthropologist on Mars. Seven Paradoxical Tales, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sacks, O., 1997: The Island of the Colorblind and Cycad Island, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sauve, K., 1999: Gamma–band synchronous oscillations: Recent evidence regarding their functional significance, Consciousness & Cognition: An International Journal 8, 213–224.

    Google Scholar 

  • Savage–Rumbaugh, E.S., 1986: Ape Language, Columbia University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt, K.E., Galuske, R.A. and Singer, W., 1999: Matching the modules: Cortical maps and longrange intrinsic connections in visual cortex during development, Journal of Neurobiology 41, 10–17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schnitzler, A. and Ploner, M., 2000: Neurophysiology and functional neuroanatomy of pain perception, J. Clin. Neurophysiol. 17, 592–603.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J.R., 2000: Consciousness, Annual Review of Neuroscience 23, 557–578.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J.R., 1992: The Rediscovery of the Mind, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shadlen, M.N. and Movshon, J.A., 1999: Synchrony unbound: a critical evaluation of the temporal binding hypothesis, Neuron 24, 67–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperry, R.W., 1985: Consciousness, personal identity, and the divided brain, in D.F. Benson and E. Zaidel (eds), The Dual Brain, The Guilford Press, New York, pp. 11–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steriade, M. and Amzica, F., 1996: Intracortical and corticothalamic coherency of fast spontaneous oscillations, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 93, 2533–2538.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steriade, M., McCormick, D.A. and Sejnowski, T.J., 1993: Thalamocortical oscillations in the sleeping and aroused brain, Science 262, 679–685.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, J.G., 1998: Cortical activity and the explanatory gap, Consciousness & Cognition 7, 109–148.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tolle, T.R., Kaufmann, T., Siessmeier, T., Lautenbacher, S., Berthele, A., Munz, F., Zieglgansberger, W., Willoch, F., Schwaiger, M., Conrad, B. and Bartenstein, P., 1999: Region–specific encoding of sensory and affective components of pain in the human brain: A positron emission tomography correlation analysis, Ann. Neurol. 45, 40–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • Treede, R.D., Apkarian, A.V., Bromm, B., Greenspan, J.D. and Lenz, F.A., 2000: Cortical representation of pain: Functional characterization of nociceptive areas near the lateral sulcus, Pain 87, 113–119.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M., 1997: A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character, in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Guzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 329–340.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M., 1999: Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion, Mind 108, 705–725.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M., 2000: Consciousness, Color, and Content, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tyler, L.K., deMornay–Davies, P., Anokhina, R., Longworth, C., Randall, B. and Marslen–Wilson, W.D., 2002: Dissociations in processing past tense morphology: Neuropathology and behavioral studies, J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14, 79–94.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Gulick, R., 1997: Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal knowledge and explanatory gaps, in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Guzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 559–566.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whiten, A., Goodall, J., McGrew, W.C., Nishida, T., Reynolds, V., Sugiyama, Y., Tutin, C.E., Wrangham, R.W. and Boesch, C., 1999: Cultures in chimpanzees, Nature 399, 682–685.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilkinson, H.A., Davidson, K.M. and Davidson, R.I., 1999: Bilateral anterior cingulotomy for chronic noncancer pain. Neurosurgery 45, 1129–1134.

    Google Scholar 

  • Willis, W.D., 1985: Pain pathways in the primate, Prog. Clin. Biol. Res. 176, 117–133.

  • Willis, W.D. and Westlund, K.N., 1997: Neuroanatomy of the pain system and of the pathways that modulate pain, J. Clin. Neurophysiol. 14, 2–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wong, E.T., Gunes, S., Gaughan, E., Patt, R.B., Ginsberg, L.E., Hassenbusch, S.J. and Payne, R., 1997: Palliation of intractable cancer pain by MRI–guided cingulotomy, Clin. J. Pain 13, 260–263.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zeki, S., 1993: A Vision of the Brain, Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford.

  • Zeki, S., 1999: Inner Vision, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Musacchio, J.M. Dissolving the Explanatory Gap: Neurobiological Differences Between Phenomenal and Propositional Knowledge. Brain and Mind 3, 331–365 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022911411903

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022911411903

Navigation