Elsevier

Computer Communications

Volume 22, Issue 8, 25 May 1999, Pages 742-744
Computer Communications

Research note
Cryptanalysis of a remote login authentication scheme

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-3664(99)00036-5Get rights and content

Abstract

In this article, we present a cryptanalysis of Wu’s proposed efficient remote login authentication scheme which is based on simple geometric properties on the Euclidean plane. We show that the scheme contains pitfalls in the authentication phase.

Introduction

In 1995, Wu proposed an efficient remote login authentication scheme [1] which is based on simple geometric properties on the Euclidean plane. Wu’s scheme is much simpler to implement than other remote login authentication schemes. The main advantage of this scheme is that users can choose and freely change their passwords, and the proposed system does not need verification tables for authenticating login requests.

Wu claimed that the security of his scheme is based on the shared line Li constructed in the registration phase. However, if an illegal user has the ability to reconstruct Li, then he can impersonate a legal user by forging a valid authentic message and replaying it to pass the check in the authentication phase. In this article, we show that an illegal user may intercept a valid login request and replay it later to impersonate a legal user.

Section snippets

The weakness of Wu’s scheme

The proposed remote login authentication scheme is based on simple geometric properties on the Euclidean plane [1]. It is divided into three phases: registration, login, and authentication. The registration phase is completed by the central authority (CA), whose main role is to deliver a smart card to each registered user. The smart card contains four public parameters, denoted as IDi, f, P, and Ai, which are used in the login and authentication phases. The parameters are defined as follows:

  • •

    IDi

Conclusions

In this article, we presented a cryptanalysis of Wu’s remote login authentication scheme. We have shown that an illegal user can easily intercept a valid login request and replay it later to impersonate a legal user in the authentication phase.

References (2)

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This research was partially supported by the National Science Council, Taiwan, R.O.C., under contract no.: NSC88-2213-E-324-002.

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