Incentivising selective fishing under a policy to ban discards; lessons from European and global fisheries

Highlights

• A discard ban in isolation will create little incentive for more selective fishing.

• Supporting management measures create economic incentives for selective fishing.

• Reducing fishing opportunities are a strong incentive for change.

• Managing discards must form part of a system that constrains fishing mortality.

Abstract

The reduction of discards in European fisheries has been identified as a specific objective of the reform of the EU Common Fisheries Policy. To reduce the uncertainty in catch data and the socially unacceptable waste of resources that results from the disposal of catch at sea, a policy to ban discards has been proposed. Discard bans are currently implemented in Alaska, British Columbia, New Zealand, the Faroe Islands, Norway and Iceland. Experience from these countries highlights that a policy of mandatory landings can result in a reduction in discards, but relies upon a high level of surveillance or economic incentives to encourage fishers to land more of their catch. Discard bans will also not result in long term benefits to stocks unless total removals are reduced, through the avoidance of undersized, non-commercial or over quota catch. Experience shows that additional management measures are required to incentivise such a move towards more selective fishing. Success has resulted from the use of area closures and bycatch limits, with potential applications in EU fisheries. However, selective fishing will not be a panacea for the current state of European fisheries; discard bans and accompanying measures must be embedded in a wider management system that constrains fishing mortality to reasonable levels before sustainable exploitation can occur.

Introduction

Discarding, where a portion of a vessel's catch is returned to the sea dead or alive [1], is a widespread problem in EU fisheries. 40–60% of catch is discarded by North Sea beam trawlers, whilst discard rates of 30% are estimated for bottom trawlers in the Northeast Atlantic [2]. The incentives for discarding are numerous, but result from multiple species and size of fish occurring in the same area and being captured by fishing gear of limited selectivity [3]. In EU fisheries, regulations define the catch that can be legally landed. Fish that exceed quota, are below minimum landing size (MLS) or do not meet catch composition regulations cannot be retained and must be discarded [4]. Catch will also be discarded if it is of poor quality, small size, or of a non-commercial species resulting in a low market value [5]. Disposal at sea results in much of this catch being undocumented, introducing additional uncertainty into the stock assessments of commercial species and making it more difficult to determine appropriate fishing mortality levels [3]. Consequently, the reduction of discards in European fisheries has been identified as a specific objective of the proposed reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) [6]. To facilitate this aim, the implementation of a discard ban in combination with catch quotas has been proposed [7]. Dependent upon the level of compliance a discard ban should result in a reduction in discards. However this will only benefit stocks in the long term if a reduction in total removals and therefore fishing mortality is achieved [3]. In the case of commercial species, reducing the fishing mortality of juvenile fish would allow a greater number of individuals to survive and reproduce [8], with a subsequent growth in the size of stocks and exploitable catch [9]. However, experience shows that in the absence of incentives to fish more selectively and avoid the capture of formerly discarded catch, a discard ban will not result in more sustainable fisheries [10]. Discard bans have been implemented in a number of fisheries around the world, including the US Alaskan and British Columbian groundfish trawl fisheries, and in New Zealand, Icelandic, Norwegian and the Faroese fisheries. This paper briefly assesses the effect of these discard bans and the surrounding management system, identifying whether any benefits of the policy have been observed, primarily through the reduction of discards and incentivising of more selective fishing through the avoidance of undersized, over quota and non-target species. The experience from UK fisheries projects and pilot schemes in incentivising a behaviour change in fishers is also evaluated. Finally, conclusions are drawn from both sets of observations to provide a number of lessons that can be used by UK fisheries managers when implementing the new discards policy under a reformed CFP.