Identification method of market power abuse of generators based on lasso-logit model in spot market
Section snippets
Indicator system for identifying the market power abuse of generators
The construction of a scientific indicator system is the basis for accurately identifying the market power abuse of generators. Based on the supervision indicators of generator transaction behavior in domestic and foreign power markets [[31], [32], [33]], combined with China's power market's actual application, this section constructs an indicator system for identifying the market power abuse of generators.
Case analysis
Based on the electricity market's spot transaction data in a certain region, this study analyzes the 7-day transaction data of 174 thermal generators as the research objective. The market is cleared every 15 min, and 96 clearings on a certain day are selected as the research cycle.
In China's day-ahead market, generators submit the declaration curve one day in advance. Therefore, this study determines the declared capacity of each segment based on the declaration curve of the generators.
Conclusions
With the advancement of the electricity spot market, the electricity market's massive data exhibit features such as non-equilibrium and high-dimensionality, which poses a challenge for accurately identifying the market power abuse of generators. This study designs an indicator system for identifying the market power abuse of generators, introduces Lasso variable selection into the binary logit model, and proposes an identification method for the market power abuse of generators based on the
Role of the funding source
Bo Sun and Minmin Teng provided financial support for the conducting of the study and preparation of the article. Bo Sun formulated overarching study goals. Minmin Teng supervised the planning and execution of the study.
Author contributions
Bo Sun: Conceptualization, Funding acquisition. Ruilin Deng: Methodology, Software, Validation, Writing – original draft. Bin Ren: Investigation. Minmin Teng: Funding acquisition, Supervision. Siyuan Cheng: Writing- Reviewing and Editing. Fan Wang: Data curation, Visualization.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [grant number 71972127] and the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Fund Project of the Ministry of Education [grant number 15YJCZH147].
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2022, EnergyCitation Excerpt :A GENCO known to participate unfairly in a market would suffer more from future losses than it would gain in additional profit through unfair practices. There have been sufficient studies working on market power mitigation methods [39,40]. In some cases, if any GENCO is detected with abuse of market power and earns excessively high profit, they will be punished with heavy penalties [41,42].