Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Using influence strategies to reduce marketing channel opportunism: The moderating effect of relational norms

  • Published:
Marketing Letters Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In an empirical study of the North American lodging industry, we investigate the efficacy of influence strategies for managing opportunism in marketing channels. We posit that the effects of influence strategies upon opportunism are moderated by the extent to which relational norms characterize the channel exchange. The results support this moderating effect. In particular, we find that relational norms have an asymmetrical effect across coercive and noncoercive influence strategies. With high relational norms in the relationship, a channel member’s use of noncoercive influence strongly limits partner opportunism whereas the use of coercive influence exacerbates partner opportunism. In contrast, noncoercive influence intensifies and coercive influence mitigates partner opportunism under conditions of low relational norms. These findings offer first insights for curbing opportunism in marketing channel relationships with the simultaneous use of different socialization mechanisms.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, J. S., & Overton, T. S. (1977). Estimating nonresponse bias in mail surveys. JMR, Journal of Marketing Research, 14, 396–402 (August). doi:10.2307/3150783.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bagozzi, R. P., & Youjae, Y. (1988). On the evaluation of structural equation models. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 16, 74–94 (Spring). doi:10.1007/BF02723327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bhatnagar, D. (1993). Evaluation of managerial influence tactics: A study of Indian bank managers. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 8, 3–9. doi:10.1108/02683949310024748.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bonoma, T. V. (1976). Conflict, cooperation and trust in three power systems. Behavioral Science, 21, 499–514 (November). doi:10.1002/bs.3830210605.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyle, B., Dwyer, R. F., Robicheaux, R. A., & Simpson, J. T. (1992). Influence strategies in marketing channels: Measures and use in different relationship structures. JMR, Journal of Marketing Research, 29, 462–473. doi:10.2307/3172712.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brown, J. R., Dev, C. S., & Lee, D. J. (2000). Managing marketing channel opportunism: The efficacy of alternative governance mechanisms. Journal of Marketing, 64, 51–65 (April). doi:10.1509/jmkg.64.2.51.17995.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dant, R. P., & Schul, P. L. (1992). Conflict resolution processes in contractual channels of distribution. Journal of Marketing, 56(1), 38. doi:10.2307/1252131.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dev, C. S., Brown, J. R., & Lee, D.-J. (2000). Managing marketing relationships: Making sure everyone plays on the team. The Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 41, 10–20 (August).

    Google Scholar 

  • Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations. American Sociological Review, 27, 31–41 (February). doi:10.2307/2089716.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Falbe, C. M., & Yukl, G. (1991). Consequences for managers of using single influence tactics and combination of tactics. Academy of Management Journal, 35(3), 638–652. doi:10.2307/256490.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. F. (1981). Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error. JMR, Journal of Marketing Research, 18(1), 39–50. doi:10.2307/3151312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frazier, G. L., & Rody, R. C. (1991). The use of influence strategies in interfirm relationships in industrial product channels. Journal of Marketing, 55, 52–69 (January). doi:10.2307/1252203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frazier, G. L., & Sheth, J. N. (1985). An attitude–behavior framework for distribution channel management. Journal of Marketing, 49, 38 (Summer). doi:10.2307/1251614.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frazier, G. L., & Summers, J. O. (1984). Interfirm influence strategies and their application within distribution channels. Journal of Marketing, 48, 43–55 (Summer). doi:10.2307/1251328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frazier, G. L., & Summers, J. O. (1986). Perceptions of interfirm power and its use within a franchise channel of distribution. JMR, Journal of Marketing Research, 23, 169–176 (May). doi:10.2307/3151664.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frazier, G. L., Gill, J. D., & Kale, S. H. (1989). Dealer dependence levels and reciprocal actions in a channel of distribution in a developing country. Journal of Marketing, 53, 50–69 (January). doi:10.2307/1251524.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ganesan, S. (1994). Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing, 58(2), 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1992). Do norms matter in marketing relationships? Journal of Marketing, 56, 32–44. doi:10.2307/1252040.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ivens, B. S. (2004). How relevant are different forms of relational behavior? An empirical test based on Macneil’s exchange framework. Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 19, 300–309. doi:10.1108/08858620410549929.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jaccard, J., Turrisi, R., & Wan, C. K. (1990). Interaction effects in multiple regression. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jap, S. D., Manolis, C., & Weitz, B. A. (1999). Relationship quality in buyer–seller interactions in channels of distribution. Journal of Business Research, 46, 202–213. doi:10.1016/S0148-2963(98)00032-0.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • John, G. (1984). An empirical investigation of some antecedents of opportunism in a marketing channel. JMR, Journal of Marketing Research, 21, 278–289. doi:10.2307/3151604.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Joshi, A. W. (1998). How and why do relatively dependent manufacturers resist supplier power. Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 6, 61–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joshi, A. W., & Arnold, S. J. (1997). The impact of buyer dependence on buyer opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships: The moderating role of relational norms. Psychology and Marketing, 14, 823–845 (December). doi:10.1002/(SICI)1520-6793(199712)14:8<823::AID-MAR5>3.0.CO;2-G.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kasulis, J. J., & Spekman, R. E. (1980). A framework for the use of power. European Journal of Marketing, 14, 180–191. doi:10.1108/EUM0000000004899.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaufmann, P. J., & Dant, R. P. (1992). The dimensions of commercial exchange. Marketing Letters, 3, 171–185 (May). doi:10.1007/BF00993996.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaufmann, P. J., & Stern, L. W. (1988). Relational exchange norms, perceptions of unfairness, and retained hostility in commercial litigation. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32, 534–552 (September). doi:10.1177/0022002788032003007.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lusch, R. F., & Brown, J. R. (1982). A modified model of power in the marketing channel. JMR, Journal of Marketing Research, 19, 312–323 (August). doi:10.2307/3151565.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Macneil, I. R. (1980). The new social contract. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mason, C. H., & Perreault Jr., W. D. (1991). Collinearity, power, and interpretation of multiple regression analysis. JMR, Journal of Marketing Research, 28, 268–280 (August). doi:10.2307/3172863.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mohr, J., & Nevin, J. R. (1990). Communication strategies in marketing channels: A theoretical perspective. Journal of Marketing, 54(4), 36–51. doi:10.2307/1251758.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mohr, J. J., & Sohi, R. S. (1995). Communication flows in distribution channels: Impact on assessments of communication quality and satisfaction. Journal of Retailing, 71(4), 393–416. doi:10.1016/0022-4359(95)90020-9.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parsa, H. G. (1999). Interaction of strategy implementation and power perceptions in franchise systems: An empirical investigation. Journal of Business Research, 45, 173–185 (June). doi:10.1016/S0148-2963(97)00228-2.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Payan, J. M., & McFarland, R. G. (2005). Decomposing influence strategies: Argument structure and dependence as determinants of the effectiveness of influence strategies in gaining channel member compliance. Journal of Marketing, 69, 66–79 (July). doi:10.1509/jmkg.69.3.66.66368.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Payan, J. M., & Nevin, J. R. (2006). Influence strategy efficacy in supplier–distributor relationships. Journal of Business Research, 59, 457–465. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2005.10.002.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879–903. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Podsakoff, P. M., & Organ, D. W. (1986). Self-reports in organizational research: Problems and prospects. Journal of Management, 12, 531–544 (Winter). doi:10.1177/014920638601200408.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Provan, K. G., & Skinner, S. J. (1989). Interorganizational dependence and control as predictors of opportunism in dealer–supplier relations. Academy of Management Journal, 32, 202–212 (March). doi:10.2307/256427.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19(1), 90–118. doi:10.2307/258836.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rokkan, A. I., Heide, J. B., & Wathne, K. H. (2003). Specific investments in marketing relationships: Expropriation and bonding effects. Journal of Marketing Research, 40, 210–224 (May). doi:10.1509/jmkr.40.2.210.19223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schurr, P. H., & Ozanne, J. L. (1985). Influences on exchange processes: Buyer’s preconceptions of a seller’s trustworthiness and bargaining toughness. The Journal of Consumer Research, 11, 939–953 (March). doi:10.1086/209028.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simpson, J. T., & Mayo, D. T. (1997). Relationship management: A call for fewer influence attempts? Journal of Business Research, 39, 209–218 (July). doi:10.1016/S0148-2963(96)00205-6.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stoddard, J. E., Keith, J. E., & Brown, J. R. (2000). The measurement of influence strategies in distribution channels: Scale development and testing. Journal of Marketing Channels, 7, 83–108. doi:10.1300/J049v07n04_05.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Venkatesh, R., Kohli, A. K., & Zaltman, G. (1995). Influence strategies in buying centers. Journal of Marketing, 59, 71–82 (October). doi:10.2307/1252329.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wathne, K. H., & Heide, J. B. (2000). Opportunism in interfirm relationships: forms, outcomes, and solutions. Journal of Marketing, 64, 36–51. doi:10.1509/jmkg.64.4.36.18070.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Business and Economics, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, 26506-6025, USA

    James R. Brown

  2. Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 55455, USA

    Stephan Grzeskowiak

  3. School of Hotel Administration, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14853-6901, USA

    Chekitan S. Dev

Authors
  1. James R. Brown
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Stephan Grzeskowiak
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Chekitan S. Dev
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Stephan Grzeskowiak.

Additional information

The authors acknowledge support for this study from the summer research program of the Cornell University School of Hotel Administration and the two hotel companies we studied and thank Reed Fisher for help with the data collection.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Construct measures

Buyer opportunistic behavior

  1. 1.

    Sometimes we have had to alter the facts slightly in order to get what we need from headquarters

  2. 2.

    To get the necessary support from headquarters, we sometimes mask the true nature of our needs

  3. 3.

    On occasion, my hotel has had to lie to headquarters about certain things in order to protect our interests

Seller coercive influence

Promises

  1. 1.

    Your partner promises to make things easier for you if you agree to the request

  2. 2.

    Your partner makes promises to give something back in return for specific actions by your company

  3. 3.

    If you go along with your partner, they promise certain services for you

Legalistic pleas

  1. 4.

    Your partner stated or implied that your legal agreement either suggested or required compliance

  2. 5.

    Your partner makes a point to refer to legal agreements you have when attempting to influence your actions

  3. 6.

    In attempting to change your behavior, your partner draws your attention to your contractual agreement with them

  4. 7.

    Your partner indicates that you are contractually bound to observe their requests

Threats

  1. 8.

    Your partner makes it clear that failing to comply with their requests would result in penalties against your business

  2. 9.

    Your partner states or implies that you might receive poorer service and/or cooperation if you do not comply

  3. 10.

    If you did not go along with your partner, they threatened to withdraw certain services from you

  4. 11.

    If you do not agree to their suggestions, your partner would make things difficult for you

  5. 12.

    Your partner threatens to cancel or refused to renew your contract if you refuse their requests

Seller noncoercive influence

Recommendations

  1. 1.

    Your partner states or implies that by following their suggestions, your hotel would be more profitable (or have higher volume or greater share, etc.)

  2. 2.

    If you comply with the request, your partner predicts higher profits (or increased share, volume, etc.) for your hotel

  3. 3.

    Your partner anticipates that by adhering to their advice, your company would make more money, increase sales, etc.

Information exchange

  1. 4.

    Your partner tries to convert you to see the beneficial effects of a policy by giving you details on a broad spectrum of company matters

Relational norms

Harmonization of conflict

  1. 1.

    My hotel and headquarters are very conscientious, responsive, and resourceful in maintaining a cooperative relationship

  2. 2.

    Both parties try to resolve any disagreements that arise between us in good faith

  3. 3.

    The high level of mutual trust between my hotel and headquarters enable us to settle our disagreements to everyone’s satisfaction

  4. 4.

    Both my hotel and headquarters are generally able to resolve disagreements to both parties’ satisfaction

Preservation of the relationship

  1. 5.

    Both my hotel and headquarters consider the preservation of our relationship to be important

  2. 6.

    My hotel and headquarters are committed to the preservation of a good working relationship

  3. 7.

    Both my hotel and headquarters think it is important to continue our relationship

  4. 8.

    Both my hotel and headquarters work hard at cultivating a good working relationship

Specification of roles

  1. 9.

    Even though our relationship with headquarters is not complex, we are still uncertain about who does what (reversed)

  2. 10.

    Our two organizations have well-formed expectations of each other which go beyond buying and selling of products and services

  3. 11.

    Even though our relationship with headquarters is extremely complicated, both parties have clear expectations as to the role each performs

Control variables

Buyer motivational investment in seller

  1. 1.

    Our current brand affiliation is essential to the success of our hotel

  2. 2.

    What proportion of your sales is accounted for by the brand’s reservations system? (1—very small proportion; 7—very large proportion)

  3. 3.

    Compared to other brands, this one is much more successful at generating sales revenue for its affiliated hotels

Buyer replaceability

  1. 1.

    Which organization in this relationship could more easily replace the other with a comparable partner? (1—our hotel could more easily replace our partner; 7—our partner could more easily replace us)

  2. 2.

    Which organization in this relationship has more feasible alternatives for replacing the other? (1—our hotel has more feasible alternatives; 7—our partner has more feasible alternatives)

  3. 3.

    If our relationship were to terminate, our partner could easily find another comparable replacement hotel in our market area

Scale anchors are 1—strongly disagree to 7—strongly agree unless otherwise noted.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Brown, J.R., Grzeskowiak, S. & Dev, C.S. Using influence strategies to reduce marketing channel opportunism: The moderating effect of relational norms. Mark Lett 20, 139–154 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11002-008-9053-2

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11002-008-9053-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation