Abstract
Negotiation behaviour is usually seen as an intervening variable—adapted to structural and institutional conditions, but with sufficient degrees of freedom to leave its own imprint on outcomes. Little is known, however, about the extent to which negotiation behaviour in fact shapes outcomes. This paper addresses that question, building on data from the Miles et al. (Environmental regime effectiveness: confronting theory with evidence. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002) environmental regimes project. Four main conclusions can be inferred from the analysis. First, the Miles et al. core model seems to account for a fair amount of the variance observed in the strategies adopted by “pushers” and “laggards,” but it also leaves ample scope for other explanations. Second, both of these groups respond to the choice of strategy made by the other. Third, adding negotiation strategies to the Miles et al. core model does not significantly change the conclusions obtained from that model itself. Finally, sometimes negotiation strategies—in particular combinations of strategies—nevertheless make a real difference, often through interplay with other factors. To better understand when and how this occurs, we need models that are more sophisticated and a combination of methodological tools designed for aggregating as well as separating effects.
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Notes
I use the labels “structural,” “institutional” and “cognitive” as proposed by Parsons (2007, 12).
The same applies to another major study, Breitmeier et al. (2006), which examines variance in regime effectiveness through statistical analysis.
In the analysis below, the main distinction will be between the “inclusive” strategy and the other two (common label: “assertive”).
One of the capacity components—informal entrepreneurial leadership—has been left out of the analysis in this paper because of empty cells problems.
Moreover, the correlations are higher for benign and mixed problems (.64*, bivariate) than for problems that are predominantly malignant (.28, bivariate).
Consistent with this interpretation is also the conclusion that institutional capacity serves to enhance regime effectiveness, particularly effectiveness measured as problem solving (Underdal 2002b).
The distribution of power in the basic game generally yields weaker correlations (.22; range .18–.29).
Also, laggards seem most likely to adopt an inclusive strategy whenever the group of intermediates is strong.
Those who surmise that this example merely confirms what we all know may want to turn to the same fund of folk wisdom to explain why no similar pattern is found for pushers.
Regime negotiations usually generate their own consequences, over and beyond those that can be attributed to the cooperative arrangements they may establish. International conferences are often large-scale exercises in learning. Moreover, they often generate new incentives for participating governments to do well in the eyes of important constituencies. For some governments, such stimuli may induce unilateral change in policies or practices, even in the absence of any international obligations.
Table 4 shows a positive effect on behavioural change. Had I used ordinal regression instead, results would have been consistently negative, though not significant, for both dimensions of effectiveness.
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Acknowledgments
I gratefully acknowledge useful comments from two anonymous reviewers and excellent editorial assistance by Frank Azevedo.
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Appendix: The Miles et al. core model
The codebook can be found in Miles et al. (2002, pp. 479–485). The data file used in the analysis reported here can be obtained from the author.
Appendix: The Miles et al. core model
1.1 Dependent variables (regime effectiveness)
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Behavioural change, measured in relation to the hypothetical state of affairs that would have existed in the absence of the regime
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Problem solving, measured as correspondence with expert advice
1.2 Independent variables
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The knowledge base: level and scope of uncertainty about the problem and available options
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The political malignancy of the problem: an ordinal level index including
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Incongruity between the interests of individual actors and those of the group at large (externalities, in some instances reinforced by competition)
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Asymmetry among parties (for example, upstream–downstream relationships)
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Cumulative cleavages (across issues)
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The institutional capacity: an ordinal level index including
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The decision rule(s) in use
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The role of the secretariat
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The role of conference presidents and committee chairs
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Provisions (if any) for “fast track” options
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The distribution of power (over the configuration of interests)
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The supply of entrepreneurial (informal) leadership by delegates or delegations
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Underdal, A. Strategies in international regime negotiations: reflecting background conditions or shaping outcomes?. Int Environ Agreements 12, 129–144 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-011-9162-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-011-9162-x