Abstract
Over the past several decades, European international environmental institutions have evolved, heeding institutionalist calls for stronger institutions backed by sanctioning and dispute settlement mechanisms. This apparent increase in institutional strength has led to a corresponding increase of the behavioral effectiveness, or active compliance management of institutions as observed in the incidence of arbitral tribunal decisions. However, upon closer examination, it is apparent that this behavioral effectiveness has not been exclusively due to provisions for arbitral tribunal decisions within international environmental agreements. Rather, the incidence and enforcement of these arbitral tribunal decisions is linked to the institutional design of the enforcement mechanisms. Most international environmental agreements rely on parties to raise disputes and enforce commitments, causing individual countries to bear the cost of enforcement. In addition, bringing a dispute to an arbitral tribunal requires the accordance of the parties to the dispute. In contrast, the European Court of Justice allows for enforcement to originate from a strong central authority and for the cases of arbitration to be filed unilaterally. International environmental agreements that have been joined by the European Community and have a provision for an arbitral tribunal have stronger enforcement mechanisms, are more likely to result in enforcement action, and are more effective in generating behavioral change.
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Notes
Institutional effectiveness has a variety of definitions including participation, compliance, behavioral, and environmental effectiveness. These competing/complementary definitions will be discussed in detail below.
Ringquist et al. (2005) provide an excellent overview of the institutional design of European IEAs.
Or the dispute could linger on if the costs of arbitration are deemed to be higher than the benefits gained by resolution.
Europe, in this paper, is defined in a geographical sense and includes both EU and non-EU states.
The Court of First Instance was not considered because it does not have authority over interstate disputes involving IEAs.
Cases where individuals or firms were defendants were not considered because the level of analysis that I am interested in relates to state behavior, and how international environmental agreements change state behavior.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine when or why the provisions of a treaty are not enforced. When a treaty is not enforced it is often unobservable, because there is no independent measurement of compliance for the treaties. Cases where the defendant wins does not necessarily mean that the treaty was unenforced, but may instead pertain to the specifics of the case. Thus, the number of enforcement actions that lead to greater enforcement of a treaty is the only observable measurement of treaty enforcement and is used in this study as an indicator of the enforcement of each treaty.
The PCA and the ICJ can hear cases across a broad variety of issue areas and interstate disputes, while the ITLOS can only hear cases pertaining to ocean space, its uses, and resources. In 2001, the PCA adopted a special set of rules specifically pertaining to environmental dispute resolution and is designed to help resolve disputes arising from IEAs.
For a discussion of the coding instrument, please see Ringquist et al. (2005).
Communication with Jeannettine Veldhuijzen, Environmental Officer, Royal Netherlands Embassy 11 July, 2006.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank and acknowledge the EU Center for Excellence at Indiana University for its generous funding, Mark Axelrod, Tun Myint, Harro van Asselt, and Elinor Ostrom, and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments, as well as Evan Ringquist for his guidance with the quantitative assessment.
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Appendix A: European environmental agreements
For additional information regarding the dataset or to obtain data for replication purposes, please contact the author.
Appendix A: European environmental agreements
1.1 Soil quality and conservation
Convention on the Protection of the Alps (Alpine Convention), Salzburg, 1991
1.2 Water quality and pollution
Agreement on the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution, Bern, 1963
Convention on the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollution, Bonn, 1976
Convention on the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution from Chlorides, Bonn, 1976
European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, Madrid, 1980
Protocol Amending the European Agreement on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Detergents in Washing and Cleaning Products, Strasbourg, 1983
Additional Protocol to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, Strasbourg, 1995
Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, Rotterdam, 1998
Protocol No. 2 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities Concerning Interterritorial Co-operation, Strasbourg, 1998
1.3 Sea/river water quality and pollution
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Oslo, 1972
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, Paris, 1974
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Helsinki, 1974
Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances, Bonn, 1983
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Paris, 1992
Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, Bucharest, 1992
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Helsinki, 1992
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, 1992
Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas, New York, 1992
Protocol on Protection of the Black Sea Marine Environment against Pollution from Land Based Sources, Bucharest, 1992
Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, Sofia, 1994
Protocol on Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the Black Sea Marine Environment by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Emergency Situations, 1994
Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, London, 1999
Convention For The Protection Of The Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Barcelona, 1976
Protocol For The Prevention Of Pollution Of The Mediterranean Sea By Dumping From Ships And Aircraft, Barcelona, 1976
Protocol Concerning Co-Operation In Combating Pollution Of The Mediterranean Sea By Oil And Other Harmful Substances In Cases Of Emergency, Barcelona, 1976
Protocol For The Protection Of The Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution From Land-Based Sources, Barcelona, 1980
Convention For The Protection Of The Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution: Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas (1982, 1995), Barcelona, 1982
Cooperation Agreement for the Protection of the Coasts and Waters of the North-East Atlantic against Pollution, Lisbon, 1990
1.4 Animal/species protection and management
Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture, Paris, 1902
International Convention for the Protection of Birds, Paris, 1950
European Convention for the Protection of Animals during International Transport, Paris, 1968
European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, Strasbourg, 1976
Additional Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Animals during International Transport, Strasbourg, 1979
European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, Strasbourg, 1979
European Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and Other Scientific Purposes, Strasbourg, 1986
European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals, Strasbourg, 1987
Agreement on the Conservation of Bats in Europe (EUROBATS), London, 1991
Protocol of Amendment to the European Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and Other Scientific Purposes, Strasbourg, 1998
Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of the Middle European Population of the Great Bustard (MOU), 2000
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Oslo, 1973
1.5 Fishing/management/use of harvestable fish
Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets and the Size Limits of Fish, London, 1946
Convention Concerning Fishing in the Waters of the Danube, Bucharest, 1958
Fisheries Convention, London, 1964
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts, Gdansk, 1973
Protocol on the Conservation, Rational Utilization and Management of Norwegian Spring Spawning in the Northeast Atlantic, Oslo, 1996
Agreed Record of Conclusions of Fisheries Consultations on the Management of the Norwegian Spring Spawning Herring Stock in the Northeast Atlantic for 1997, Oslo, 1996
Convention On The Conduct Of Fishing Operations In The North Atlantic, London, 1967
Convention On Future Multilateral Cooperation In Northeast Atlantic Fisheries, London, 1980
Convention For The Conservation Of Salmon In The North Atlantic Ocean, Reykjavik, 1982
1.6 Hazardous substances
European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Geneva, 1957
European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways (AND), Geneva, 2000
Agreement on International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), applicable as from 1 July 2001, 2001
Agreement on International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), applicable as from 1 January 2003, 2002
1.7 Land use and land use planning
European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, London, 1969
European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, La Valette, 1992
1.8 Air quality
Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution, Geneva, 1979
Protocol on the reduction of sulfur emissions, Helsinki, 1985
Protocol concerning the control of nitrogen oxides or their transboundary fluxes, 1988, Sofia
Protocol concerning the control of emissions of voc or their transboundary fluxes, 1991, Geneva
Protocol on further reduction of sulfur emissions, 1994, Oslo
Protocol on persistent organic pollutants, 1998, Aarhus
Protocol on heavy metals, 1998, Aarhus
1.9 Atmosphere/climate/outer space
Convention Establishing the European Centre for Medium-range Weather Forecasts, Brussels, 1973
1.10 Environmental conservation
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Aarhus (Denmark), 1998
Convention For The Establishment Of The European And Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization, Paris, 1951
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Matisoff, D.C. Are international environmental agreements enforceable? implications for institutional design. Int Environ Agreements 10, 165–186 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-010-9118-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-010-9118-6