Abstract
This study analyzes the information content of the financial reports of the management-controlled firm in an efficient market. The firm's disclosure fulfills two roles: it is the basis of the principal-agent contract—stewardship role, and it is an input to the market price informativeness (decision making) role. Optimal disclosure is derived as the outcome of the firm's owner-manager-potential buyer game. The seller and the buyer maintain principal-agent relationships with the manager, who alone observes verifiable and unverifiable information on the value of the firm. The market's price of the firm, as well as the manager's compensation, depend on the firm's reports. The firm's owner directs the manager to report verifiable information, at least, (due to the threat of coalition forming) and stewardship information, at most. The market's reaction to the financial reports depends on the information available to the market prior to their release.
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Ronen, J., (Lewinstein) Yaari, V. The disclosure policy of the firm in an efficient market. Rev Quant Finan Acc 3, 311–324 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02406994
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02406994