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Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond pp 149–170Cite as

Inside the Black Box: The Variety of Hierarchical Forms

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Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 48))

Abstract

The rapidly extending success of transaction cost economics has attracted attention primarily to the decisive role of its concepts in explaining agents’ choices to “make” by themselves, to “buy” through market exchanges, or to enter into transactions through intermediate forms. Because transactions require institutional supports and are costly, there is a continuous trade-off among using the price mechanism, relying on administrative coordination, or having recourse to “hybrid forms.”

Previous versions of this paper were extensively discussed at conferences on “Recent Developments in Transaction Cost Economics” (Sorbonne, May 1994) and “Transaction Costs and Beyond” (Erasmus Universiteit, June 1994). I am particularly indebted to the researchers from ATOM and to Bianchi, Loasby, Nooteboom, and Williamson for their comments, critiques, and suggestions. Davenport helped me to polish the paper.

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Authors
  1. Claude Ménard
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, GRASP / Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    John Groenewegen

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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Ménard, C. (1996). Inside the Black Box: The Variety of Hierarchical Forms. In: Groenewegen, J. (eds) Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 48. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1800-9_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1800-9_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7302-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1800-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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