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Trust and Commerce in Open Source — A Contradiction?

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Trust in the Network Economy

Part of the book series: Evolaris ((EVOLARIS,volume 2))

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Abstract

While for a long time open source was only known by insiders of the information technology industry, it has recently received public recognition. Meanwhile, Linux and its founder Linus Torvalds have reached near-cult status. Some open source projects, such as Apache1, have already captured leading market positions.

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Wien

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Osterloh, M., Rota, S., Kuster, B. (2003). Trust and Commerce in Open Source — A Contradiction?. In: Petrovic, O., Ksela, M., Fallenböck, M., Kittl, C. (eds) Trust in the Network Economy. Evolaris, vol 2. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-6088-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-6088-6_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7091-7227-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-7091-6088-6

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