Abstract
In the Athenian democracy, political parties had been outlawed. All powers were in the hands of citizens themselves. By selecting, appointing, monitoring and recalling the officials and civil servants, citizens managed to control effectively phenomena of extreme individualism. To their success contributed also the kind of education they received and the social pressure to behave in accord with the ethical norms that prevailed. Central were the objectives and the freedoms of citizens as individuals. This priority was dominant and was ensured through institutions that protected property rights, enforced private contracts and facilitated voluntary transactions and entrepreneurship. In this chapter, we explain how governance by the people in the context of a proto-capitalist economy enabled the city–state of Athens in classical times to attain an unprecedented measure of civilisation in the history of mankind.
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Notes
- 1.
Thucydides, II. 15, 1.28. Demosthenes, Epitaph, 28, Against Neaera, 75, Plutarch, Theseus, 24.
- 2.
The formation of the city is due to factors such as agricultural cultivation, the belief of citizens in the same gods and their common worshipping ceremonies, colonisation and the creation of a ruling class (Starr 1985, 38–47). With the exception of colonisation, all other factors may have affected the establishment of the city–state of Athens.
- 3.
- 4.
Isocrates, Panegyricus, 23–4. Lysias, Epitaph to Corinthians, 17–9. Demosthenes, Epitaph, 4–5.
- 5.
Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, IV.
- 6.
Pentakosiomedimnoi and hippeis were respectively the first and the second highest of the four Athenian social classes. For example, hippeis were men who could afford to maintain a war horse in the service of the city–state of Athens.
- 7.
Thucydides, II. 15, 1. Plutarch, Solon, 12. 3.
- 8.
Another explanation is the one that has been proposed by de Tocqueville (1840, 8–11). His view is that (a) the route to democracy was not opened by a centralised authority and (b) over time the people acquired economic power and forced the kings and the aristocracy to yield civil rights. Democracy in ancient Athens was discovered neither by centralised authority nor under the pressure of some isolated economic or other factors. It seems, therefore, that it emerged spontaneously and due to the confluence of many historical circumstances that magnified its effectiveness for society.
- 9.
In ancient Greece, the chief magistrate in various city–states was called Archon (Archontes in the plural). In Athens a system of nine concurrent Archontes evolved, led by three respective remits over the civic, military and religious affairs.
- 10.
Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, XXI 2–5, XXII 1–2.
- 11.
Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, XXI.
- 12.
Under this programme, the city–state of Athens paid Attic citizens an entrance fee for attending festivals, particularly dramatic performances.
- 13.
Athenians believed that private property reinforced social cohesiveness and harmonious living. As Lysias (On the Property of the Brother of Nicias, 17) suggested:
… all of you would confess that social cohesiveness is the greatest good and that social divisiveness is the cause for all calamities and that they contradict each other, if some have their eyes on the goods of others and some others lose (unfairly) theirs.
Moreover, as Aristotle (Politics 1263a, 1278a) points out, private property ensures the establishment of individual liberties. As we will see in the next chapter, the relationship between these two institutions, which are interdependent, was analysed thoroughly from the eighteenth century on by Locke, Rousseau, J. S. Mill, Hayek, etc.
- 14.
The aforementioned principles are described in Demosthenes, Against Timocrates, 150.
- 15.
Demosthenes, On the False Embassy, 190–2.
- 16.
Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, VIII 5.
- 17.
Aristotle, Politics, 1317α40–1418 α10, The Athenian Constitution, XLIII 1.
- 18.
Lysias, On the Scrutiny of Evandros, 6–7, 11–3. Against Philon, 5. Mainly the nominees ought to have (a) not offended the city and (b) taken good care of their parents, since as the Athenians believed, if someone did not do that, one would have not any incentive and moral standing to do the same for one’s fellow citizens ( Lysias, Against Philon, 22–24).
- 19.
Since the Athenians did not have a written constitution, the controls and the limits of city–state powers were defined by laws enacted through the Vouli.
- 20.
Euripides, The Suppliants, 36–357.403–408, 432–438. Herodotus, ΙΙΙ, 80. Aristotle, Politics, 1292b 21–34.
- 21.
Lysias, Against Philon, 2.
- 22.
Plato (Republic, 557a) and Aristotle (Politics 1277α, 1–30,1317b, 15) point out that the essence of the Athenian democracy was found in that “anyone could live as anyone wished”, provided that anyone did so within the prevailing social, moral and legal context.
- 23.
Demosthenes, Exordia, ΚΗ’, 2.
- 24.
Herodotus, V.78, Thucydides, II 37. Isocrates, Areopagiticus, 20. Demosthenes, Against Midias, 124.
- 25.
This is how Manville and Ober (2003, 9–12) have described it.
- 26.
Michels (1962, 353–4) explains why in the representative democracies of today an oligarchy of politicians may take hold, in which one party replaces the other, thus becoming in essence a cast of oligarchs who neglect the interests of citizens. As argued by Alford (1985), something like this could not happen easily in the Athenian democracy.
- 27.
According to Vlassopoulos (2007), the exchange of opinions and the discussion among Athenians took place anywhere in the city under conditions of an open society. In turn, this extended “political market”, along with the freedom of speech and the isegoria in the Vouli, reinforced the democratic institutions of Athens (e.g. see Saxonhouse (2006)).
- 28.
Ober (2008) has documented with a rich variety of data that the Athenian democracy led to remarkable development and dissemination of knowledge, as well as to procedures that helped arrive at the best possible decisions for the individuals and the city at large.
- 29.
Kyriazis and Karayiannis (2011) analyze the process by which decisions of major significance were taken by the Ecclesia of Demos and how this process reduced the extent of ill-conceived decisions.
- 30.
Lysias (Against Agoratus, 9–10) and Demosthenes (Against Timocrates, 212–3) give relevant examples. Many centuries later, Popper (1945, II, 152) suggested that for its defence contemporary democracy should render counter democratic experiments very costly for those who attempt them in relation to democratic compromises.
- 31.
Andocides, On the Mysteries, 83; Demosthenes (Against Timocrates, 8–9, 17–23, 35–8).
- 32.
For example, if the chief of a tribe made an error in the listing of the horsemen in his tribe and as a result the chief had given larger supports than those that were due, then the chief would defray the excess outlays from his own pocket (Lysias For Mantitheus, 7).
- 33.
Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, XLIII, LXI. Demosthenes, Erotic Essay, 55. They believed that the absence of meritocracy would destroy the city (Lysias, Against Nichomachus, 26–7).
- 34.
There was a specific body of citizens who controlled the management of public fortune by those who carried out public services (Lysias, Defence Against a Charge of subverting the Democracy, 11).
- 35.
Such cases are mentioned by Lysias, Defence against a Charge of Subverting the Democracy, 11; Against Epicrates and his Fellow Envoys, 3; Against Ergocles, 9; and Demosthenes, Against Androtion, 17.
- 36.
One of the most important elements of democracy was that every citizen could control the person that had a civic position or exercised civic service (Aeschines, Against Timarchus, 32).
- 37.
Lysias, Defence against a Charge of subverting the Democracy, 11. On the Property of Aristophanes, 50–2. Against Nicomachus, 23–5. Demosthenes, On the False Embassy, 146–7. Against Androtion, 68.
- 38.
Examples are given by Thucydides, IV, 65; Deinarchos, Against Demosthenes, 60-.1; Lysias, Against Ergocles, 1. Against Philocrates, 2, 9. Lysias, Defence Against a charge of Taking Bribes, 16–7. In particular, the name of the civil servant who was found guilty of taking bribes or stealing money from the city, the felony he had committed and the penalty imposed on him were written in a public pillar so that social scorn accompanied him for long rather than for a short while (Demosthenes, On the False Embassy, 268, 271).
- 39.
Demosthenes, Against Aristogiton, B’, 1–5.
- 40.
Hypereides, Against Demosthenes, XV, XXIV. Demosthenes, On Organization, 1, 30.
- 41.
Lysias, For Polystratus, Demosthenes, Against Neaera, Antiphon, On the murder of Herodes.
- 42.
Demosthenes, Against Leocharus, 37–8.
- 43.
Lysias, On the Refusal of a Pension, 4–8, 26. Demosthenes, On Organization, 2–3. The Archontes in each Demos were obliged by law to take care of the poor and the orphans in their region, to protect them from unfair treatment by the rich and to bury those who died in a way befitting their poor fellow citizens (Demosthenes, Against Macaratus, 58, 75). They also provided to poor Athenians money to watch theatrical shows (Demosthenes, Against Leocharus, 37–8), and all knew that those who received money were not rich. It was forbidden for someone to receive money under the Theorikon programme from two different municipalities, and if one did so and was caught, one would be strictly punished because the act was considered theft of public money (Demosthenes, Against Leocharus, 38–9).
- 44.
- 45.
- 46.
Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, II.2, V.2, X.1–2, XII.1–4.
- 47.
Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, VII.3.
- 48.
To get a glimpse into the range and the variety of the laws that pertained to economic relationships in ancient Athens, see Karayiannis and Hatzis (2011). In the light of that legal framework, it is not surprising that in our times, many researchers (e.g. see Copp (2008)) try to determine legal arrangements for the protection of property rights that will result in the most efficient operation of the markets.
- 49.
It is striking that the judges who were appointed in the Supreme Court, i.e. the Heliaia, gave an oath which included the phrase:
I will not allow the write off of private debts, nor the redistribution of land and houses that belong to Athenian citizens.
(Demosthenes, Against Timocrates, 149). Additionally, private property was considered “natural law”, which no one could repeal or ask for its repeal by the Ecclesia of Demos (Demosthenes, Against Aristocrates, 61–2). To substantiate further this point, it suffices to mention that in case someone owed money to a person and the city (due to a rent), from the seizure of his property, the person would be paid first and then the city, if there were any money left (Lysias, On the Property of Eraton, 4–5, 7). In short, property rights were so inviolable that the most democratic societies of our times would be envious.
- 50.
Spreading business risks through partnerships took place mainly in the trades of sea transport and the excavation of silver from the mines of Lavrio.
- 51.
Pausanias, Attica, 24.3.
- 52.
For an extensive account of their views regarding the functions of management, see Bitros and Karayiannis (2012).
- 53.
For example, Amemiya (2007).
- 54.
Demosthenes, Against Midias, 185.
- 55.
Demosthenes, Against Midias, 101, Against Nicostratus, 4–5, 8, 12.
- 56.
- 57.
That this was the mandate of the city’s agencies we know from Lysias (Against the Corn Dealers).
- 58.
From the research of de Jasay (2007), it follows that the issues regarding the voluntary or coercive nature of progressive taxation are nowadays as contested as ever. One such issue springs from the realisation that progressive taxation is based on a right of the majority to impose higher tax obligations on the minority (wealthy). But this right is inconsistent with the principle of equality of citizens. Athenians were well aware of this inconsistency, and to ameliorate it, they introduced mechanisms of social pressures and rewards. The analysis by Kelen (2001, 7–58), which highlights the numerous positive effects that would result from a more voluntary and less coercive taxation, ascertains how superior the approach of the Athenians to this problem was, relative to the dominant practices in the democracies of today.
- 59.
Isocrates, Antidosis; Demosthenes, Against Phaenippus. The effects of the mechanism of antidosis were not limited to the reduction of inequality in the distribution of wealth. In addition, after the court’s decision, the citizen who was found guilty had to pay all court expenses, and above all, he was socially disgraced. For, as Lysias (Against Simon, 20) writes, neither the courts nor his fellow citizens considered him honest and a citizen with integrity.
- 60.
In our view the painstaking research by Ober (2011) confirms these achievements in ancient Athens beyond reasonable doubt.
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Bitros, G.C., Karayiannis, A.D. (2013). The Athenian Democracy. In: Creative Crisis in Democracy and Economy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33421-4_1
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