Abstract
This paper discusses Fiscal Illusion as a special case of Agents and Multiagents Systems. Under fiscal illusion, each taxpayer does not realize how much he/she really pays to the State; therefore, he/she does not evaluate well the public actions. We will study this issue as a particular case of a ‘Dictator game’ with relevant applications not only for Public Finances but also for specific domains like Pervasive agents and Ambient Intelligence, or for User-centered applications and Assisting Agents.
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Mourão, P. (2012). A Case of Dictator Game in Public Finances–Fiscal Illusion between Agents. In: Omatu, S., De Paz Santana, J., González, S., Molina, J., Bernardos, A., Rodríguez, J. (eds) Distributed Computing and Artificial Intelligence. Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, vol 151. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28765-7_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28765-7_29
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