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40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 pp 213–218Cite as

Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?

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Abstract

Economists from (1776) to (1981) agree that poor protection of property rights is bad for growth. But why is this problem so severe? Why do Peru (Hernando De Soto, 1989) and Equatorial Guinea (Robert Klitgaard, 1990) fail to grow at all when public and private rent-seeking make property insecure? In this paper, we explore two reasons why rent-seeking, meaning any redistributive activity that takes up resources, is so costly to growth.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 E. 58th Street, Chicago, IL, 60637

    Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer

  2. Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138

    Robert W. Vishny

Authors
  1. Kevin M. Murphy
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  2. Andrei Shleifer
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  3. Robert W. Vishny
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for the Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, MSN 1D3 Fairfax, Virginia, 22030, USA

    Roger D. Congleton

  2. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785, Berlin, Germany

    Kai A. Konrad

  3. Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900, Ramat-Gan, Israel

    Arye L. Hillman

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (2008). Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?. In: Congleton, R.D., Konrad, K.A., Hillman, A.L. (eds) 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-79185-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-79247-5

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