Abstract
In this chapter, Jasmin Habib and Michael Howard provide an assessment of the political economy which brought Trump to power under the “America First” slogan. They also argue that Trump in power will attempt to reengineer policies along populist nationalist lines, both domestically and internationally. While endeavoring to provide higher employment for American workers and greater profits for American businesses, such policies will undermine the globalized economic order and the global reach of the American imperium.
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Notes
- 1.
McMaster and Cohn (2017) make this clear.
- 2.
- 3.
See Howard (2017). President Obama was by no means exceptional in the statement of his views. Even so-called Left parties in Europe, Britain, and the United States have embraced a similar neoliberal and progressivist agenda. See, for example, Frank (2016), Fukuyama (2016), Lilla (2017), Mair (2013), and Sassoon (1996).
- 4.
See Anderson (2013), Bacevitch (2010), Doyle (1984), Gowan (2010), Joint Chiefs (2015), Kagan (2012), McCoy (2017), Munkler (2007), Rosenberg (1994), and Said (1979). These references make it very clear that empires are not alike in their colonial practices and are not always wholly exploitative. Said (1979), for example, argues that the French, the British, and the American’s relationships to the peoples of the Middle East, while imperial, were radically different.
- 5.
- 6.
Recognizing this implies nothing as to the moral worth of these notions, however they are defined. It should also be recognized that many nationalisms have proved tolerant. Others, of course, have not, and all nationalisms can be deemed deficient according to progressivism in that they rest upon distinctions between included and excluded. But in virtually all cases, nation-states recognize that naturalization is possible, so allowing outsiders “in.” So far as racism in America is concerned, five factors help explain its persistence, and its effects are not limited to Trump supporters. First, American slavery prior to the civil war that ended it was highly racialized (unlike many other slave systems). Second, American nationalism began to be formed before the civil war and the end of slavery. Third, the victory of the North did not destroy the power of the Southern ruling class and redistribute property to both poor whites and former slaves, which would have made for a radical bourgeois revolution and laid a much firmer foundation for the elimination of racism. See Moore (1966) and Davidson (2017). Fourth, it was not until the 1950s that there were serious attempts by federal governments to enforce civil and political rights. Fifth, while this has been partially effective, racism has also been recharged and widened by the return of mass immigration to the United States since the 1970s, which coincided with the era of working-class wage stagnation. It should also be noted that all classes in the United States are pretty much as racist as each other, and it is only the manifestations that are different. See Williams (2017), pp. 59–72. This includes many progressives, whose main difference from overt racists appears to be a lack of self-consciousness. For a Trumpian outline of how racism could be tackled in contemporary America, see Horowitz (2017).
- 7.
Of course, no nation is completely homogenized. There is typically a patchwork of differences between regions, classes, and cohorts. Nonetheless, in tranquil times, these differences are seen by members as analogous to those of a quilt in which the differences constitute a whole, and one that is recognized as such.
- 8.
Anderson (1991). The title of this book is Imagined Communities , but describing nations as such is not meant to imply that they are fake or insubstantial. Quite the reverse, in fact. Nations are regarded as genuine communities and their imagined quality relates to the fact that each member typically knows only a very small subset of other members. Anderson also argues cogently that neither liberals nor Marxists have appreciated the strength of national allegiances as a result of picturing themselves as agents of universalism, like some “progressives” today. See also Habib (2004, 2007, 2017).
- 9.
See, for example, Smith (1988).
- 10.
- 11.
It may be helpful in appreciating this point to note that Max Weber, whose contribution to understanding the rationalization process is unsurpassed, was also an ardent German nationalist. See Mommsen (1989) for a good account of all this. The world of modernity remains a world of structural divisions and cultural particularities, and there are very strong forces operating to keep it that way. Of course, there are contrary drives with a universalist thrust, most notably those of capitalism, which underpin the contradictions we focus on. But, as Ernest Gellner so often noted, capitalism is “cold.” It cannot satisfy human needs for “warmth” that are met by cultural particularisms, including those of nations. And in appreciating this point it is wise not to forget that virtually all “mentalities” and ideologies can appear absurd to those who do not share their distinctions or their commitments. This is especially relevant for orthodox economists, who abstract from the “social” and the “cultural.” For example, Martin Wolf, chief economics correspondent of the Financial Times, wrote on July 11, 2017, that “Borders are arbitrary” and that “Global economic integration is … a natural extension of market forces in an era of rapid technological innovation.”
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
Williams (2017) argues that the white working class look up to those who have “made it,” but they are anti-government. They often perceive government intervention in their lives in negative terms (taxes being too high; having to deal with bureaucracy in order to gain access to services they deserve, etc.). The poor depend on the state much more and are perceived as deficient for doing so. And, more generally, governments are faulted for aiding people who do not deserve support, not just the poor. However, Williams also points out that the white working class underestimates the support they receive from governments in the United States. Mudde (2004) makes a similar argument in relation to right populists in Europe. Nonetheless, it is true that the bulk of the American working class, and the vast majority of Trump supporters, are very much in favor of social security and healthcare programs, which are universal and are considered a just entitlement for a lifetime of work.
- 15.
See Anderson (1991).
- 16.
- 17.
As stated in the introduction, we deal with them in terms of political economy and the broader social theory that frames it. By contrast, many analysts of Trump’s electoral victory appear to have jettisoned both in favor of pie chart quantification. This does not mean that they lack methodological rigor, only that the variables they use and the results they deduce are conceptually problematic. For example, there has been much statistical analysis of what it was that made voters vote for Trump, and particularly whether their own individual economic deprivation or individual racism was the dominant motive. See, for example, McElwee and McDaniel (2017). This atomized perspective does not connect with the social, or the national, or the ideological. See, Williams (2017), pp. 59–72, and, as a direct counter, Monnat and Brown (2017).
- 18.
- 19.
Howard and King (2008).
- 20.
Milanovic (2016). Referring to inequality as a cause of populism does not mean that people are intently observant and directly moved by changes in Gini coefficients and the like. It is the change in circumstances that underpins the indices measuring inequality that drive the politics. In the case of the United States, “The typical white working-class household income doubled in the three decades after World War II but has not risen appreciably since.” And, from 1970, “professional-elite wages have increased dramatically, while wages of high-school educated men fell 47%.” Williams (2017), pp. 3 and 91.
- 21.
- 22.
See Cottier (2018) and Rodrik (2011). It is frequently claimed that all forms of globalization increase efficiency, and therefore the total output that can be produced from a given set of factors of production. This may very well be true as any good book on international economics will demonstrate. But it will also show that the costs and benefits are likely to be far from equally distributed, and, in the present situation, many workers in advanced capitalist countries will be losers. See, for example, Krugman et al. (2012), Parts 1 and 2, and Brennan (2018). The demonstration of the efficiency effects also ignores the globalization of finance and the tendency of neoliberal finance to produce crises, which in a globalized world spread rapidly. Nor does it take account of the political effects of increased inequality. In this regard, it is important to note, as does Fukuyama (2016), p. 64, that the compensatory retraining programs promised to “losers” by the US government have “failed to move large numbers of workers into higher skilled positions.” It has also been proposed that globalization has contributed to preserving peace between countries, but this is a very shaky claim indeed; see Howard and Kumar (2007) and MacDonald (2015).
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
The pervasiveness of social media and the widening of associations between people internationally, in work and leisure, may well have had the same effect outside elite circles. See Goodhart (2017). On selling diversity, see Abu Laban and Gabriel (2002). For critical theoretical perspectives on nationalism, multiculturalism, and their exclusions, see Day (2000), Kymlicka (1995), Mackey (1999).
- 26.
See the references in Note 24.
- 27.
We say “renewed” because this was an argument of Kennedy (1987), but one which had a limited impact at the time because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the American ascent to unipolar status.
- 28.
See Pilbean (2013), pp. 42, 48, 270, and 514 for data on American payments, deficits, and debt. On the other matters of imperial overstretch, see the references in Note 4.
- 29.
There is some truth in what Trump claims. See, for example, Friedman (2017). As to whether the USA is taken advantage of in matters of trade is another matter. It is easy to tell stories to this effect because all countries have different institutions and policies that can form part of a narrative of unfairness, but there are no clear-cut criteria determining what unfairness means. Nevertheless, many American workers have suffered greatly from imports, most notably from China since it was allowed into the WTO in 2001, and these have fueled major social problems and support for populists. See, for example, Autor et al. (2017, 2018), and Monnat and Brown (2017).
- 30.
- 31.
See, for example, Campbell and Ratner (2018).
- 32.
Having the EU listed as revisionist may appear absurd, but if deeper integration succeeds, it could certainly become a great power, and structural imperatives would likely quickly force it to be such. Important tensions already exist between the USA and EU, and not just over matters of trade. The financial crisis of 2008, which led to severe divisions inside the EU, had a US signature, and American wars in the Arab world have brought the migrant crisis to Europe. Furthermore, it has been known at least since the revelation about the hacking of Chancellor Merkel’s phone that US global surveillance does not even exempt leaders of major allies.
- 33.
Clausewitz (1832).
- 34.
Shapiro (2018). Trump has severely criticized some bureaucracies, and it has led his detractors to take this as indicative of his ignorance, and worse. At a minimum, those who make such condemnations need to acquaint themselves with the classic social theory regarding the informational advantages and institutional interests of bureaucracies. Gerth and Mills (1948), Part II, would be a good place to begin.
- 35.
- 36.
See McCoy (2017), Part 3, Rachman (2017), and Trenin (2016). Symonds (2018) is useful for understanding the increasing military capabilities of Russia and China. However, the author presumes, along with many others in the commentariat, that the interests of the United States still lie in maintaining global hegemony and using this to contain both Russia and China. This is especially troubling because the Economist in which the article appears is the premier magazine on economics, a subject which prides itself on having the expertise to calculate costs, benefits, and risks. However, perhaps the stance reflects an extrapolation from the successful containment of the USSR. If so, it is inappropriate. The Soviet Union was autarkic, while neither Russia nor China is today. Thus, maintenance of American global hegemony is very much more threatening to both than it was to the Soviet Union. See Macdonald (2015).
- 37.
- 38.
However, implementing protectionist policies has become less easy in recent decades because international trade has become more complex. For advanced economies there is typically more import content in exports and more export content in imports, making protectionist policies difficult to fashion, along with coalitions that will support them. Furthermore, for small economies, the legal and regulatory harmonization required in contemporary trade agreements implies that they must adjust to larger economies if they wish to participate. However, this second matter does not apply to the United States since it remains “large” and most others will have to adjust to its rules rather than the converse. On all this, see Cottier (2018), despite the fact that the author is more than a little cavalier as to the difficulties of what is required to maintain globalization for all countries.
- 39.
See Patrick (2017).
- 40.
The taxation act also weakens the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) by eliminating mandatory coverage. No doubt this is popular with young and healthy Americans who are affected, but it will also raise premiums for others because it reduces the risk pool. Increased subsidies could counteract this effect to some extent, but the Trump administration has shown no indication of providing such. And it may be true that many older supporters of Trump are not favorably disposed to the ACA because they are “workers” rather than “poor,” and often see the latter as inappropriately motivated, undisciplined, and immoral. See Williams (2017), pp. 13–23. Nonetheless, the changes are not in accord with how Trump suggested he would improve health coverage in the campaign.
- 41.
See the references in Note 23.
- 42.
Trump proposed to “drain the swamp” by constraining lobbyists and implementing term limits for politicians.
- 43.
Understanding economic growth is a complex subject, but in any particular institutional and technological context, it is overwhelmingly determined by three factors: the growth of the working-age population, growth in productivity, and the extent to which there is slack in the economy and effective demand policies to eradicate it. In the case of the United States in early 2018, the first two factors are growing slowly, and the magnitude of economic slack is no longer large. Once this is eliminated, it is unlikely that the US economy can grow faster than 2% per year, and probably the rate will be less than this. Some of the economists in the Trump administration claim that the taxation changes will so impact incentives that the sustainable growth rate will rise to around 3%. However, similar claims have been made in the past and proved erroneous. Nonetheless, a program of infrastructural renewal could have efficiency effects that do raise the growth rate for a significant period of time.
- 44.
However, some deregulatory measures have been successfully appealed in the courts on the grounds that they contravened procedures required by law in the relaxation of their provisions.
- 45.
The Trump administration has emphasized the importance of deregulation. However, there is at least one area where regulation needs to be extended and enforced more strictly, namely, in anti-trust policy. There is considerable evidence that the market power of many corporations has increased during recent decades. Trump is following his recent predecessors in doing nothing about this matter, and his proposed infrastructure plan will only make matters worse.
- 46.
Minsky (1986).
- 47.
Bacevitch (2017).
- 48.
- 49.
For an outline of some of the dystopian possibilities, see Frase (2016). And, of course, the dire implications of automation are not limited to the American working class. They apply to the working classes in all advanced capitalist societies, as well as many middle-class professionals too. Automation is not only technologically “progressive,” it is also very “inclusive,” and in no way “culturally prejudiced.”
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Habib, J., Howard, M. (2019). The Political Economy of Donald J. Trump. In: Kowalski, J. (eds) Reading Donald Trump. The Evolving American Presidency. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93179-1_6
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