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Inequity and Dispute

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Book cover Construction Dispute Research Expanded

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Abstract

Contractors are often stepping into contracts that are notably inequitable as far as risks and responsibilities are concerned. In this study, Equity Gap (EG) is used to describe the differentials created ex ante between the developer and the contractor. This study analyses the roles of EG in cultivating disputes. Four EG elements are proposed: information, risk, power and return on efforts. The conceptualisation of EG was achieved by arranging the EG elements into a framework. This representation enabled statistical testing of the framework. Data were collected from 106 senior project professionals with almost numbers working for developer and contractor respectively. The conceptual framework was validated through PLS-SEM analysis. The followings are recommended to bridge EG ex post: (a) Setting relational incentive to balance power differential; (b) Allowing reallocation of risk and return as deemed necessary and appropriate; and (c) Enhancing tasks programmability for ease of monitoring and evaluation. It is believed that by addressing EG ex post, the chance of having disputes would be reduced.

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Acknowledgements

The empirical work of this chapter has been reported in a paper entitled “Equity Gap in Construction Contracting: identification and ramifications” of the Journal of Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management. The funding support of a CityU SRG (project no. 7005557) is duly acknowledged.

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Zhu, L., Cheung, S.O. (2022). Inequity and Dispute. In: Cheung, S.O. (eds) Construction Dispute Research Expanded. Springer Tracts in Civil Engineering . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80256-1_6

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