Skip to main content

Efficient and Secure Password Authentication Schemes for Low-Power Devices

  • Conference paper

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCCN,volume 3794))

Abstract

In 2003, Lin et al. proposed an improvement on the OSPA (optimal strong-password authentication) scheme to make the scheme withstand the stolen-verifier attack, using smart card. However, Ku et al. showed that Lin et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the replay and the denial of service attack. In 2004, Chen et al. proposed a secure SAS-like password authentication schemes. Their schemes can protect a system against replay and denial-of-service attacks. In this paper, we propose two efficient and secure password authentication schemes which are able to withstand replay and denial-of-service attacks. The proposed schemes are more efficient than Chen et al.’s schemes in computation costs. Moreover, the proposed schemes can be implemented on most of target low-power devices such as smart cards and low-power Personal Digital Assistants in wireless networks.

This work was supported by the Brain Korea 21 Project in 2005.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Lamport, L.: Password Authentication with Insecure Communication. Communications of ACM 24(11), 770–772 (1981)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  2. Shimizu, A.: A Dynamic Password Authentication Method by One-way Function. IEICE Transactions J73-D-I(7), 630–636 (1990)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Shimizu, A., Horioka, T., Inagaki, H.: A Password Authentiation Methods for Contents Communication on the Internet. IEICE Transactions on Communications E81-B(8), 1666–1673 (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Sandirigama, M., Shimizu, A., Noda, M.T.: Simple and Secure Password Authentication Protocol (SAS). IEICE Transactions on Communications E83-B(6), 1363–1365 (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Lin, C.L., Sun, H.M., Hwang, T.: Attacks and Solutions on Strong-password Authentication. IEICE Transactions on Communications E84-B(9), 2622–2627 (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Chen, C.M., Ku, W.C.: Stolen-verifier Attack on Two New Strong-password Authentication Protocols. IEICE Transactions on Communications E85-B(11), 2519–2521 (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Lin, C.W., Shen, J.J., Hwang, M.S.: Security Enhancement for Optimal Strong-password Authentication Protocol. ACM Operating Systems Review 37(2), 7–12 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Ku, W.C., Tsai, H.C., Chen, S.M.: Two Simple Attacks on Line-Shen-Hwnag’s Strong-password Authentication Protocol. ACM Operating Systems Review 37(4), 26–31 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Chen, T.H., Lee, W.B., Horng, G.: Secure SAS-like Password Authentication Schemes. Computer Standards and Interfaces 27(1), 25–31 (2004)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Kim, KW., Jeon, JC., Yoo, KY. (2005). Efficient and Secure Password Authentication Schemes for Low-Power Devices. In: Jia, X., Wu, J., He, Y. (eds) Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks. MSN 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3794. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11599463_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11599463_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30856-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32276-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics